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Albinger v. Harris6/6/2002
refusal to return the ring upon demand constituted unjust enrichment. Harris contends she deserves the ring because Albinger repeatedly beat her, forcibly took the ring back, and was the one who finally ended the engagement by ordering Harris to move out of the residence where they had been living together.
The District Court declined to undertake a determination of which party was at fault in terminating the engagement. The court cited the following three reasons: 1) judicial holdings that fault is an inappropriate concern in matters of family relations; 2) pragmatic difficulties in discerning fault when the conduct of both parties likely contributes to the failure of a relationship; and, 3) aversion to concepts of legal "rightness" and "wrongness" regarding the choice of a marriage partner. We agree, and affirm that judicial fault-finding is irrelevant and immaterial in the adjudication of matters of antenuptial gifting under existing law, absent fraud or deceit.
The District Court employed the "conditional gift" theory advanced by Albinger to determine present ownership of the disputed engagement ring. The theory holds that an implied condition of marriage attaches to the gift of a ring upon initial delivery due to the ring's symbolic association with the promise to marry and, when the condition of marriage fails, the incomplete gift may be revoked by the giver. Albinger urges this Court to affirm the District Court's conclusion that the ownership of an engagement ring remains with the one who gave the ring when plans to marry are called off.
Only in engagement ring cases does precedent from other jurisdictions weigh heavily for conditional gift theory in the absence of an expressed condition. See collected cases, Elaine Marie Tomko, Annotation, Rights in Respect of Engagement and Courtship Presents when the Marriage Does Not Ensue (1996), 44 A.L.R. 5th 1. See also Benassi v. Back & Neck Pain Clinic, Inc. (Minn. 2001), 629 N.W. 2d 475 ; Meyer v. Mitnick (Mich. 2001), 625 N.W.2d 136; Lindh v. Surman (Penn. 1999), 742 A.2d 643; Heimann v. Parrish (Kan. 1997), 942 P.2d 631; Vigil v. Haber (N.M. 1994), 888 P.2d 455. Considering it "unduly harsh and unnecessary" to require a hopeful suitor to express any condition upon which a ring might be premised, many courts stepped in to impute the condition of marriage. Fierro v. Hoel (Iowa 1990), 465 N.W.2d 669, 671. In practice, courts presume the existence of the implied condition of marriage attaching to an engagement ring in the absence of an expressed intent to the contrary. Fanning v. Iverson (S.D. 1995), 535 N.W.2d 770; Brown v. Thomas (Wis. 1985), 379 N.W. 2d 868; Lyle v. Durham (Ohio 1984), 473 N.E. 2d 1216. A party meets the burden of establishing the conditional nature of the gift by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the ring was given in contemplation of marriage. Fierro, 465 N.W.2d at 671. "Not only does this rule of law establish a `bright line' for situations where the parties involved are unlikely to have considered the necessity of making an `agreement to the contrary,' but the rule also eliminates the need for a trial court to attempt the often impossible task of determining which, if either, party is at fault." McIntire v. Raukhorst (Ohio 1989), 585 N.E.2d 456, 458.
Since the issue of ring ownership when the engagement ends without marriage is a matter of first impression, we will briefly review early breach of promise jurisprudence, look to some American customs associated with engagement rings, analyze the judicial imputation of a condition in the context of Montana gift law, and examine conditional gift theory in light of the constitutional prohibition against gender bias.
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