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Couch v. Astec Industries6/19/2002
of values from $500,000 to $11 million and that the average value of a whole life as gleaned from these studies was $3 million. He testified that this figure included the value of an entire life from cradle to grave and included earnings as well as intangible enjoyment. When asked to specify the percentage of a whole life that Plaintiff lost as a result of his injuries, McDonald declined and explained that the jury would determine the percentage.
Defendant complains that McDonald's refusal to specify a percentage or value for Plaintiff's loss of enjoyment of life rendered his testimony unhelpful to the jury, resulting in improper juror speculation. We disagree. McDonald's testimony regarding statistical life studies gave the jury a range of monetary values that likely proved helpful in evaluating Plaintiff's claim. He also provided concrete guidance to the jury in determining a percentage of the monetary value that might reasonably compensate Plaintiff. For example, McDonald testified that people often derive enjoyment from their work above and beyond the amount they are compensated and from recreational activities. McDonald could not tell the jury how to evaluate these specifics; the jury would have to rely on other evidence, such as Plaintiff's testimony, to determine how Plaintiff derived the most enjoyment from his life and how his injuries affected that enjoyment.
This determination is similar to the jury's evaluation of pain and suffering. The law has entrusted the jury with the task of weighing the evidence of a plaintiff's pain pursuant to "the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors acting under the sanctity of [their] oath . . . with fairness to all parties," UJI 13-1807 NMRA 2002, and we see no difference in the process of evaluating the loss of enjoyment of life. To the contrary, if McDonald had complied with Defendant's request and offered a specific value for Plaintiff's hedonic damages claim, he would have intruded improperly into the fact finder's domain. See Smith, 214 F.3d at 1246 (noting that because the expert witness properly "made no attempt to apply the facts of this case to the criteria he proffered to the jury[,] the jury remained free to exercise its fact-finding function"). We therefore affirm on this issue.
Evidence of Government Regulations
Defendant argues the trial court improperly admitted evidence of governmental regulations. Specifically, Defendant argues that the applicable governmental regulations, particularly standards of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), are directed toward employers rather than manufacturers. While we agree that this is an accurate statement, we are not persuaded that the admission of OSHA regulations was erroneous.
New Mexico law holds that the standards expressed in OSHA regulations, as developed by appropriate expert or other testimony, may be admitted as objective safety standards and practices generally prevailing in the community on the issue of negligence. See Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that under New Mexico law, industry standards are not conclusive as to ordinary care and design, but are admissible evidence); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 120 N.M. 372, 381, 902 P.2d 54, 63 (1995) (holding that evidence of compliance with industry standards is relevant to whether the manufacturer was negligent or whether the product poses an unreasonable risk of injury, but should not conclusively demonstrate whether the manufacturer was negligent or the product defective). Thus, just as Defendant's experts referred to OSHA regulations to argue that the recycling plant complied with government standards, the trial court prop
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