United Healthcare of Ohio v. Percival6/18/2002
for review and final determination. I
. We first address Blaney's assignment of error wherein she asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellee and in denying her own motion for summary judgment. Our analysis begins from the premise that we review summary judgments de novo. See Broadnax v. Greene Credit Service (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 881, 887, 694 N.E.2d 167; Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41, 654 N.E.2d 1327; Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107, 614 N.E.2d 765. That is to say we afford no deference to the trial court's decision, see Hicks v. Leffler (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 424, 427, 695 N.E.2d 777; Dillon v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. (1993), 98 Ohio App.3d 510, 514-515, 648 N.E.2d 1375; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-412, 599 N.E.2d 786, and conduct our own review to determine if summary judgment was appropriate. Woods v. Dutta (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 228, 233-234, 695 N.E.2d 18; Phillips v. Rayburn (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 374, 377, 680 N.E.2d 1279; McGee v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 236, 241, 659 N.E.2d 317.
. Summary judgment under Civ.R. 56(C) is appropriate when the movant can demonstrate that (1) there are no genuine issues of material fact, (2) it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the opposing party; said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in their favor. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370, 1998-Ohio-389, 696 N.E.2d 201; Mootispaw v. Eckstein, 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 1996-Ohio-389, 667 N.E.2d 1197; Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46. With these principles in mind, we turn our attention to the proceedings below.
. The facts in the case sub judice are not in dispute. No one contests the fact that appellee is subrogated to the interest of Wyatt's father, or that appellee paid $35,521.79 in medical bills on Wyatt's behalf. Also, those expenses were incurred because of Percival's and Corcoran's negligence. Blaney's arguments are, instead, directed at legal issues.
. First, Blaney argues that the common pleas court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over appellee's claim. Blaney asserts that probate courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of a minor's personal injury claim. Although we agree with her position as an abstract proposition of law, we believe that she carries that principle too far in this case.
. The provisions of R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(e)&(s) vest probate courts with the exclusive jurisdiction to appoint guardians, to direct and control their conduct, to settle their accounts and to act for and issue orders regarding wards. Moreover, probate courts are deemed to be the superior guardian of wards subject to its jurisdiction. Guardians are directed to obey all orders of the court concerning their wards or guardianship. R.C. 2111.50(A)(1).
. When a minor child has suffered a personal injury , a guardian may settle the child's claim with the advice, approval and consent of the probate court. R.C. 2111.18. These statutes make it clear that probate court jurisdiction extends to all matters which touch the guardianship and the personal injury claims of minors. See In re Guardianship of Derakhsham (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 190, 196, 673 N.E.2d 954; Ohio Dept. of Mental Health v. Baldauf (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 467, 472, 669 N.E.2d 39; In re Zahoransky (1985), 22 Ohio App.3d 75, 76, 488 N.E.2d 944.
. However, when a child sustains an injury as the result of negl
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