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United Healthcare of Ohio v. Percival6/18/2002
igence, two separate and distinct causes of action arise: an action by the child for his personal injuries and a derivative action in favor of the child's parents for loss of services and for medical expenses. Grindell v. Huber (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 71, 275 N.E.2d 614, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Whitehead v. Genl. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10, at paragraph three of the syllabus. Thus, in the case sub judice, Wyatt's parents had a cause of action for the loss of his services and for the medical expenses they incurred as a result of his injuries. Because Wyatt's father had health insurance to cover Wyatt, and because the terms of that insurance provided for the right of subrogation for the insurance company to the extent of medical bills paid on Wyatt's behalf, that insurance company (appellee) now stands in the position of Wyatt's father to the extent of the $35,521.79 it paid for Wyatt's medical expenses. While the Ross County Probate Court had exclusive jurisdiction over Wyatt's personal injury claim, we are aware of no authority that vests that court with exclusive, indeed any, jurisdiction over his parents' separate claims or the subrogated claim of the insurance company. These are separate matters that do not come within the typical purview of a guardianship.
. Blaney responds by citing In re Guardianship of Jadwisiak (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 176, 593 N.E.2d 1379, at paragraph one of the syllabus, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that " probate court, in order to maintain control over any personal injury settlement entered into on behalf of a ward under its protection, has subject matter jurisdiction over the entire amount of settlement funds, which includes attorney fees to be drawn therefrom." We find nothing in that case, however, that controls the outcome in the instant case. The only claim at issue in Jadwisiak was that of the minor ward, and the only issue was whether the probate court had jurisdiction to determine fees paid to the attorney who obtained a settlement for that claim. Obviously, the payment of such fees impinged on the very heart of the guardianship (i.e. the settlement funds obtained on the ward's claim and held for the benefit of the ward) and the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over that issue. Indeed, as the Court noted, " t the core of this case is the requirement that a probate court maintain control over any personal injury settlement entered into on behalf of the ward under the probate court's protection." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 181.
. In short, Jadwisiak involved only the personal injury claim of the ward. The Ohio Supreme Court did not discuss the separate and distinct derivative claim of the parent or, as in this case, the subrogated claim of the parents' insurance company. We find nothing in either R.C. Chapter 2111 or in the Supreme Court's Jadwisiak holding that vests a probate court with jurisdiction over a parent's derivative claim for reimbursement of medical expenses. Therefore, in the instant case we find no impediment to the trial court assuming subject matter jurisdiction over this issue. Indeed, as appellee points out in its brief, at least one other Ohio appellate court has held that common pleas courts can decided subrogated claims and that such claims are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of probate courts. See e.g. Garrett v. Sandusky (May 23, 1997), 6th Dist. No. E-96-047.
. Blaney also argues that the trial court erred in not finding that appellee's claims were fully adjudicated in probate court and, because appellee did not appeal that adjudication, appellee was thus barred from asserting them below by the doctrine of res judicata. Again, we are not persuaded.
. Th
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