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O'Hail v. JG Mansfield5/30/2002
ed patrolling the common areas of the mall. DeLong patrolled the zone of the mall in which the accident occurred from approximately 4: 10 p.m. to 4: 15 p.m. DeLong testified that he was last in the specific areas of the zone where Phyllis O'Hail fell at approximately 4: 10 p.m. By 4: 35 p.m., DeLong was filling out the accident report for appellants. This time span, 4: 10 p.m. to 4: 35 p.m., includes the time in which Phyllis O'Hail fell and she and her husband walked to the mall office to report the accident. Further, and more importantly, DeLong presents no evidence as to how long the liquid was on the floor. The liquid could have been placed on the floor immediately after DeLong left the area or only a minute before Phyllis O'Hail fell. There is no evidence as to how long the liquid was on the floor, only evidence as to when DeLong patrolled the area. Therefore, appellants have failed to meet their burden to show how long the liquid was on the floor. Therefore, the appellants have not created an issue of fact as to whether the Richland Mall was negligent. Further, Phyllis O'Hail cannot say what actually caused her to fall. Appellants bear the burden to prove that Phyllis O'Hail's injuries proximately resulted from the business owner's negligence or omission, in this case the liquid on the floor. Eller v. Wendy's International, Inc. (2000), 142 Ohio App.3d 321, 334-335. Appellants argue that Joseph O'Hail, Phyllis O'Hail's husband, established that the liquid was the proximate cause of Phyllis' fall through his deposition testimony. At his deposition, Joseph testified that he saw a puddle of liquid a "split instant" before Phyllis fell. However, there was no evidence presented that the liquid caused the fall. At Phyllis' deposition, Phyllis was asked directly if the liquid caused the fall. Phyllis provided the following answer: "I would know of no other reason. I have no problems - I mean when I walk, there would be no reason for me to fall, and the way my foot went out from underneath me, something had to cause my foot to go out underneath me like that." Phyllis O'Hail Deposition, page 17-18. Appellants' claim that Phyllis slipped because of the liquid is speculation. An inference of negligence cannot arise from mere speculation. Parras v. Standard Oil Co. (1953), 160 Ohio St. 315; Streb v. Cinemark U.S.A., Inc.(Ohio App. 10 Dist. 1995), Franklin App. No. 94APE04-540, unreported, 1995 WL 78063. Appellants contention that it is reasonable to infer that her foot must have gone out from under her because of the liquid is speculative and not sufficient to raise an issue of fact. In conclusion, we find that appellants have presented no evidence as to how long the liquid was on the floor and whether the liquid caused the fall. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not error when it granted summary judgment in favor of appellees and against appellants.
Appellants' sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Richland County Court of common Pleas is affirmed.
Gwin, P.J. and Wise, J. concur
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