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Nationwide Insurance Enterprises v. Progressive Specialty6/20/2002 ressive's knowledge at the time of filing that is relevant to determining whether there was a good-faith belief that it was entitled to declaratory relief. Masseria, supra. Therefore, Renaut has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, at the time of filing its declaratory judgment actions, Progressive had a good-faith belief that it was entitled to declaratory relief.
. Renaut next argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim alleging that Progressive willfully and maliciously tortiously interfered with the contractual relationship between him and Humphrey. The Ohio Supreme Court first formally recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract in Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 415. In Kenty, the court set forth the elements of such an action as: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract; (3) the wrongdoer's intentional procurement of the contract's breach; (4) lack of justification; and (5) resulting damages. Id. at 419.
. In the present case, there is a total void in the counterclaim regarding the existence of any contract between Renaut and Humphrey. As we stated in Nationwide Ins. Enterprises v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., supra, the counterclaim alleges that Humphrey was merely Renaut's insurance agent and does not give any indication as to what kind of a contract could have existed between the two. The only other contractual relationships that may be gleaned from the counterclaim were between Renaut and Progressive, Brown Todd and Progressive, and Progressive and Humphrey. Renaut claims in his memorandum contra that "obviously" there existed a contract between him and Humphrey whereby Humphrey procured insurance coverage for the boat in question. The trial court found that this statement alone raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a contract existed between Humphrey and Renaut. However, even assuming, arguendo, that such statement does raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a contract, we agree with the trial court that Renaut has simply failed to present any evidence, make any allegations or argument, or even give any enlightening explanations regarding Progressive's knowledge of the contract, the terms of the contract, any intentional procurement of the contract's breach, or a lack of justification for the interference. Therefore, even construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Renaut, we find there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Renaut's claim for tortious interference of a contract, and reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to Renaut.
. With regard to Renaut's claim for civil abuse of process, the elements of a claim for abuse of process are: (1) that a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (2) that the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (3) that direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process. Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 294, paragraph one of the syllabus.
. Renaut argues in his memorandum contra filed below that Progressive knew there was no jurisdiction over him in the Kentucky court when it filed its action there. His counterclaim also contained the allegation that the prior proceeding in Kentucky was initiated improperly and without probable cause because Progressive had prior knowledge that the Kenton Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction. It is clear from these allegations that Renaut has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact rela
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