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Hubbard v. Chidel1/31/2002
t must determine, on remand and on the basis of the record in this case, the respective status of Dr. King, the Southwest Clinic, and the District, specifically, whether they constitute a single tortfeasor or more than one or two tortfeasors.
We next address the impact of D.C. Code § 12-309 on the contribution issue. Because of its indemnification ruling which, as we have indicated, was inappropriate in this case, the trial court raised, but sidestepped critical questions relating to the claims for contribution, including the applicability of § 12-309 to the cross claims and the third-party claim for contribution in this case. We can understand the trial court's apparent frustration with the state of the pleadings which undoubtedly impaired a cogent treatment of the contribution and § 12-309 issue. Therefore, in the interest of facilitating consideration of this issue on remand, we set forth guidance on this matter of apparent first impression.
In Group Health Ass'n v. District of Columbia Gen. Hosp., 540 A.2d 1104 (D.C. 1988), we broached, but did not decide the question of the proper interpretation of § 12-309 with respect to a third party claim for contribution; no appeal had been taken from the trial court's ruling in that case. However, we observed in passing, that the trial court "specifically rejected GHA's argument that the notice period did not begin to run until GHA itself suffered an injury in the form of a judgment against it in favor of [the plaintiffs], holding instead that the time began to run from the date on which the [plaintiff's] suit was filed." Id. at 1106. We also noted that the trial court's dismissal "appears to be consistent with the majority of court decisions on the subject," but that in two other jurisdictions "the notice period begins to run from the date of the original plaintiff's injury," or "when the original defendant discovers the third-party defendant's alleged negligence." Id. at 1106 n.6 (citations omitted).
Here, Dr. Chidel and Wener argue that Wener's § 12-309 notice to the District on April 30, 1996 was timely because it was given within six months of its being named as a party to Ms. Hubbard's lawsuit. Ms. Hubbard points out that Dr. Chidel never gave notice of his contribution claim to the District, and never filed an action against the District until after the jury's verdict. As for Wener, Ms. Hubbard argues that, "notice is due when there is notice to the claimant of an injury ."
Section 12-309 "imposes a notice requirement on everyone with a tort claim against the District of Columbia, and compliance with its terms is `mandatory as a prerequisite to filing suit against the District.'" District of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Hardy v. District of Columbia, 616 A.2d 338, 340 (D.C. 1992)). "`Compliance with § 12-309 is a question of law that we review de novo.'" District of Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427, 436 (D.C. 2000) (quoting District of Columbia v. Ross, 697 A.2d 14, 17 (D.C. 1997) (citation omitted)). Furthermore, since "`it is in derogation of the common law principle of sovereign immunity, section 12-309 is to be construed narrowly against claimants.'" Id. (quoting Gross v. District of Columbia, 734 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C. 1999) (other quotations omitted)).
In Dunmore, supra, we specifically found that "under section 12-309, the six-month [statutory notice] clock begins to run from the moment the plaintiff sustains the injury, not from the moment a cause of action accrues." Id. at 1359 (citing DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 985 (D.C. 1980)). However, in that case, we were not called upon to construe § 12-309 in the context of a third-party clai
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