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Hinnenkamp v. City of Columbia Heights2/12/2002
ther recreational-use immunity applies focuses on whether the injured party was a user of recreational property, not on whether the activity involved was recreational. See Lundstrom, 587 N.W.2d at 519 (analyzing only whether injured party was using a recreational area in finding that recreational-use immunity applied to indoor tennis court); see also Minn. Stat. §á466.03, subd. 6(e) (stating that recreational-use immunity applies "if the claim arises from a loss incurred by a user of * * * recreation property") (emphasis added). The record supports the district court's determination that the community center is a property "intended and permitted to be used for the provision of recreational services."
In arguing that section 466.03, subdivision 6(e), does not apply, Hinnenkamp asserts that as a matter of policy the statute should not apply to indoor activities. But she cites no authority for the proposition, and, in fact, she cites cases in which this court has applied recreational-use immunity to indoor activities. See, e.g., Lundstrom, 587 N.W.2d at 519.
The district court did not err by applying the recreational-use immunity statute.
II.
Hinnenkamp also argues that " f the immunity statute has this broad of a sweep, it will not pass constitutional muster as per the concerns of the court as stated in Lloyd." But Hinnenkamp's argument is a single line in her brief, and she provides no legal analysis supporting this proposition. Arguments unsupported by legal analysis should be disregarded. Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994). This court declines to reach issues in the absence of adequate briefing. See State, Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997). We do not, therefore, address Hinnenkamp's purported constitutional argument.
III.
Hinnenkamp also argues that, even if the recreational-use immunity statute applies, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the trespasser exception to the recreational-use immunity statute applies to her case. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 (1965) defines the duty owed by a municipality to users of its recreational facilities. Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 1994). Under sectioná335, a landowner is liable for failure to warn of an artificial condition that the landowner has created or maintained only if (1) the artificial condition is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm; (2) the landowner has actual knowledge of that danger; and (3) the landowner has reason to believe that trespassers would not discover the condition. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335.
Here, the city was responsible for the fact that the mixer was on the cart, but (1)ánothing in the record shows that the city was aware that the mixer on the cart was likely to cause death or serious bodily harm and (2) the mixer's placement on the cart was plainly visible; in fact, Hinnenkamp saw that configuration and used the mixer while it was on the wheeled cart. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err by concluding that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the trespasser exception to the recreational-use immunity statute applies.
Affirmed.
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