 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Harris v. Thompson Contractors2/5/2002
iew is limited to two questions: (1) whether the Commission's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence in the record; and (2) whether the findings of fact justify the Commission's conclusions of law." Peagler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 138 N.C. App. 593, 597, 532 S.E.2d 207, 210 (2000). "This is true even when there is evidence that would support contrary findings." Goff v. Foster Forbes Glass Div., 140 N.C. App. 130, 133, 535 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2000).
Defendants first contend that the Full Commission erred in determining that plaintiff's status as a prisoner did not bar recovery by plaintiff. We do not agree.
Defendants argue that G.S. § 97-13(c) bars recovery by plaintiff. It states that the "[Workers' Compensation Act] shall not apply to prisoners being worked by the State or any subdivision thereof, . . . ." G.S. § 97-13(c). Further, G.S. § 148-6 states that "such convicts so hired, or employed, shall remain under the actual management, control and care of the Department [of Correction] . . . ." In addition, a prisoner on work release "shall give his work-release earnings, less standard payroll deductions required by law, to the Department of Correction." G.S. § 148-33.1(f). Defendants contend that plaintiff was being worked by the State since plaintiff was to remain under the "actual management, control and care" of the Department of Correction ("DOC") and DOC received the prisoner's earnings.
Defendants also argue that no contract for hire existed between plaintiff and defendant Thompson. Defendants contend that a contract existed between defendant Thompson and the State, not between plaintiff and defendant Thompson. Defendants argue that the State assigned workers to Thompson and that Thompson had no say in the selection of work release employees. The Workers' Compensation Act defines employee as "every person engaged in an employment under any appointment or contract of hire . . . ." G.S. § 97-2(2). Defendants argue that this lack of contract for hire precludes plaintiff from being an employee which is necessary in order to claim benefits.
Defendants cite Parker v. Union Camp Corp., 108 N.C. App. 85, 422 S.E.2d 585 (1992) for support. In Parker, the plaintiff suffered compensable work-related injuries and received workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 86, 422 S.E.2d at 585. While receiving benefits, the plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to prison. Id. Parker held that the plaintiff "was not entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits while in prison . . . ." Id. at 88, 422 S.E.2d at 587.
We hold that the Full Commission properly determined that plaintiff's status as a prisoner did not bar plaintiff from receiving benefits. The Full Commission found that:
2. By statute, the North Carolina Department of Correction is authorized to grant work release privileges to eligible inmates pursuant to G.S. § 148-33.1. In this work release program, inmates may work in the public and private sectors and are viewed by the state as not working as agents of the state, but as individuals employed by a regular employer.
The Full Commission concluded:
3. Because the injury giving rise to this claim occurred when plaintiff, while incarcerated, was on work release, the holding in Parker is not controlling and does not bar plaintiff from recovering under the act as an employee. Parker v. Union Camp Corp., 108 N.C. App. 85, 422 S.E.2d 585 (1992).
4. On 17 September 1997, the date of his injury by accident, plaintiff was not being worked by the State or any subdivision thereof and, therefore, the provisions of G.S. § 97-13(c) do not bar plaintiff from recovering workers' compensation benefits from
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 North Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|