 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Harris v. Thompson Contractors2/5/2002
esent and continuing, with said payments to be managed and appropriately distributed by the Department of Correction under its work release program. This compensation is subject to the attorney's fee approved herein.
2. Defendants shall pay for all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred, subject to the provisions of G.S. § 97-25.1. Defendants shall reimburse the Department of Correction for any payments it has made on behalf of plaintiff relating to his medical care resulting from this injury by accident.
Plaintiff's benefits will be paid to DOC and distributed according to the usual regulations applicable to inmates' work release income. According to G.S. § 148-33.1(f)(2), plaintiff is allowed a reasonable allowance for his incidental personal expenses. Amounts are deducted from plaintiff's earnings for other costs, including plaintiff's keep, judgments and court orders. G.S. § 148-33.1(f). The remaining balance is kept and accumulated to be disbursed to plaintiff when he is discharged or paroled. Id.
On these facts we hold that the Full Commission properly concluded that this plaintiff was not barred from the recovery of workers' compensation benefits by his status as a prisoner. This holding does not affect the ability of the Department of Correction to recover money it has spent on behalf of plaintiff for his medical care.
Defendants contend that the Full Commission erred in failing to find that plaintiff's claim is barred by his willful intention to injure or kill himself. We do not agree.
Here, the Full Commission found that " efendants have failed to produce any credible evidence that plaintiff's actions on 17 September 1997 which resulted in his injuries were taken with the specific intention of injuring himself or others." The Full Commission concluded that " he evidence fails to establish that plaintiff's injuries were the result of a willful intention to injure himself or others, or the result of a willful breach of a safety rule or procedure adopted by defendant-employer."
Defendants argue that G.S. § 97-12(3) should bar plaintiff's claim. G.S. § 97-12(3) states that " o compensation shall be payable if the injury or death to the employee was proximately caused by: . . . (3) His willful intention to injure or kill himself or another." Defendants argue that plaintiff intentionally attempted to "walk" the crane with the boom and drop ball raised. Since plaintiff was aware that this was dangerous, defendants assert that plaintiff's action shows his intention to injure himself. In the alternative, defendants argue that G.S. § 97-12 should reduce plaintiff's award by ten percent. It states " hen the injury or death is caused . . . by the willful breach of any rule or regulation adopted by the employer and approved by the Commission and brought to the knowledge of the employee prior to the injury compensation shall be reduced ten percent (10%)." G.S. § 97-12. We are not persuaded.
In order for G.S. § 97-12(3) to bar compensation, "there must have been a willful intention to injure." Rorie v. Holly Farms, 306 N.C. 706, 710, 295 S.E.2d 458, 461 (1982). "Intent is usually proved by circumstantial evidence and is therefore reserved for the trier of fact." Id.
Defendant's superintendent of the work site testified that he had reprimanded plaintiff twice for walking the crane with the drop ball raised. The last reprimand was one hour before the accident. The superintendent stated that plaintiff was "making a mistake" by operating the crane that way. The superintendent testified that he did not remove plaintiff from the crane because he "had never seen him take it way up to the top. I mean, I had never seen th
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 North Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|