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Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx2/15/2002
This case broaches a question of first impression in Rhode Island: does G.L. 1956 ยง 28-29-20 (the exclusive-remedy provision) of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA or the act) bar work-related defamation claims filed by employees against their employers and co-workers? Because defamation injures an employee's reputation and because injury to reputation is not "an injury under chapters 29--38 of this title [the WCA's title 28]," we hold that the WCA's exclusive-remedy provision does not bar such claims.
Facts and Travel
The plaintiff, Richard T. Nassa (Nassa), began working for the Adams Drug Company (Adams) in July 1986 as a real estate manager. In 1987 Brooks Drug, Inc. (Brooks) acquired Adams and, a year later, Hook-SupeRx, Inc. (Hook), one of the nation's largest retail drug-store chains, acquired Brooks. In 1989 Hook promoted Nassa to the position of assistant vice president of real estate.
The defendant Peter Prokopchuk (Prokopchuk) served as Hook's vice president of planning and presentation. In November 1992, Prokopchuk allegedly told Lee Merkel, a Hook real estate manager who worked under Nassa, that "Nassa's taking money from landlords," thereby intimating that property owners had been funneling improper "kickbacks" to Nassa for procuring leases with Hook. Prokopchuk supposedly repeated this allegation to other Hook executives.
Hook also employed defendant David Saurette (Saurette) as a construction manager. Nassa alleged that Saurette repeatedly told property owners that were seeking to lease property to Hook -- as well as others in the real estate and construction industry -- that " f you want to do business with Brooks Drug, you have to pay Nassa." Nassa asserted that, as a result of these false and defamatory statements, Hook damaged his reputation and then fired him in September of 1993, causing him to lose wages.
On October 21, 1993, Nassa filed this Superior Court action against Hook, Brooks, Prokopchuk, and Saurette. His third-amended complaint contained five counts. Counts 1 and 2 alleged that the individual and corporate defendants had defamed him. Count 3 alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hook. Counts 4 and 5 alleged that Hook had violated state and federal employment-discrimination laws.
More than five years later, in May 1999, defendants moved under Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure for partial judgment on the pleadings with respect to counts 1, 2, and 3. The defendants argued that the WCA's exclusive-remedy provision barred these claims. The motion justice granted defendants' motion and entered an order and judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing these three counts. Nassa later filed this appeal, challenging only the court's grant of a partial final judgment on the defamation counts (counts 1 and 2). Thus, counts 3, 4, and 5 are not before us on this appeal.
Standard of Review
"Questions of law and statutory interpretation * * * are reviewed de novo by this Court." Heflin v. Koszela, 774 A.2d 25, 31 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Bowen Court Associates, 763 A.2d 1005, 1007 (R.I. 2001)). When construing a statute, "this court has the responsibility of effectuating the intent of the Legislature by examining a statute in its entirety and giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning." Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1049 (R.I. 1994). "If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, 'this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordina
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