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Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx2/15/2002
ry meanings' in determining the Legislature's intent." Local 400, International Federation of Technical and Professional Engineers v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 747 A.2d 1002, 1004 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)).
Analysis
Section 28-29-20 of the WCA provides, in pertinent part, that:
"The right to compensation for an injury under chapters 29--38 of this title, and the remedy for it granted by those chapters, shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law or otherwise against an employer, or its directors, officers, agents, or employees * * *."
The motion justice ruled that this exclusive-remedy statute barred Nassa's attempt to prosecute defamation claims in Superior Court because his right to compensation for his alleged injuries from these tortious acts fell within the WCA's ambit.
The WCA's statutory purpose is to "improve the safety of the workplace and the rehabilitation to gainful employment of the injured worker * * *." Section 28-29-1.2(a)(2). Enacted in 1912, the WCA also "seeks to ameliorate much of the physical, emotional, and financial adversity visited upon workers and their families in the wake of an employment-related injury." DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40, 42 (R.I. 1992). In return for obtaining a speedy no-fault compensation remedy, the incapacitated employee "gives up the right to pursue an action at law that, although potentially more remunerative, is likely to be protracted and may well be unsuccessful." Id. "Essential to this delicate quid pro quo is the 'exclusive remedy doctrine', which holds that the workers' compensation system must be the exclusive forum for an injured worker 's redress." Joan T.A. Gabel and Nancy R. Mansfield, Practicing in the Evolving Landscape of Workers' Compensation Law, 14 Lab. Law. 73, 73 (1998).
The prevalent view throughout the nation, however, is that the exclusive-remedy provisions of workers' compensation laws do not bar employment-related defamation claims. Indeed, according to the leading commentator on workers' compensation law, " t is generally held that an action for libel or slander does not come within the [workers' compensation] exclusive remedy provision. * * * [Because] the real gist of slander is not personal injury ." 6 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §104.04 at 104-16-17 (2001).
Originally, ecclesiastical courts retained exclusive jurisdiction over defamation claims because of the perceived sinful or spiritual nature of such wrongs. Indeed, the common law did not recognize a cause of action for defamation until the late 14th century. But now we conceive of defamation as a tort that "tends to injure 'reputation'" -- an intangible but much-prized piece of personalty that Shakespeare dubbed "the immortal part" of each person:
"The purest treasure mortal times afford Is spotless reputation: take that away, Men are but gilded loam or painted clay."
Injury to reputation "involves the idea of disgrace;" yet " efamation is not concerned with the plaintiff's own humiliation, wrath or sorrow." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, §111 at 771, 773 (5th ed.1984). Rather, defamation is based on "conduct which injuriously affects a [person's] reputation, or which tends to degrade him [or her] in society or bring him [or her] into public hatred and contempt * * * ." Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 860 (R.I. 1998) (quoting Elias v. Youngken, 493 A.2d 158, 161 (R.I. 1985)). In fact, some courts have gone so far as to suggest that defam
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