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Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx2/15/2002
ation does not result in a personal injury at all, but instead affects a "proprietary interest." Dockins v. Ingles Markets, Inc., 411 S.E. 2d 437, 438 (S.C. 1991) (citing Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982)).
But however one defines defamation or its consequences, the scope of the exclusive-remedy doctrine as embodied in workers' compensation law depends upon whether the alleged work-related injury is one for which the applicable workers' compensation statute provides a compensation remedy. See, e.g., Snead v. Harbaugh, 404 S.E.2d53, 54-55 (Va. 1991). In Rhode Island, the WCA provides benefits for an incapacitating "personal injury to an employee arising out of and in the course of his or her employment connected with and referable to his or her employment." Section 28-29-2 (8)(i). As both sides note in their briefs, this Court repeatedly has held that there is no wholesale intentional-tort exception to the exclusive-remedy doctrine, as codified in § 28-29-20. Thus, the WCA provides the exclusive remedy for work-related personal injuries "under chapters 29--38 of this title " -- even if the injury-causing conduct of the alleged tortfeasor was intentional. Diaz v. Darmet Corp., 694 A.2d 736, 737 (R.I. 1997); Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 670 (R.I. 1995); Coakley v. Aetna Bridge Co., 572 A.2d 295, 296 (R.I. 1990); Lopes v. G.T.E. Products Corp., 560 A.2d 949, 951 (R.I. 1989). Therefore, defendants assert, excluding work-related defamation claims from the scope of the WCA's exclusive-remedy statute would be contrary to this Court's previous decisions subjecting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy to this bar. But work-related defamation claims that cause mere intangible injuries, such as an injury to an employee's reputation, do not necessarily fall within the category of intentional torts for which workers' compensation statutes provide benefits. See, e.g., Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 413 N.E.2d 711 (Mass. 1980). The WCA compensates employees for an earnings incapacity that results from tangible, work-related personal injuries, as well as from qualifying mental or psychic injuries. A year after this Court decided Seitz v. L & R Industries, 438 A.2d 1345 (1981) (holding that an office manager who suffered from the ordinary stress and rigors of moving her office from one city to another was not entitled to obtain benefits under the WCA for her alleged psychological injuries), the General Assembly enacted § 28-34-2(36), which defined a compensable mental injury under the WCA. Section 28-34-2(36) provides:
"The disablement of an employee resulting from mental injury caused or accompanied by identifiable physical trauma or from a mental injury caused by emotional stress resulting from a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees encounter daily without serious mental injury shall be treated as an injury as defined in § 28-29-2 [(8)(i)]."
Thus, the WCA now provides benefits for an employee's disabling mental injuries under the limited circumstances defined in § 28-34-2(36). Previously, this Court has held there is no intentional-tort exception to the WCA's exclusivity provision with respect to an employee's attempt to prosecute an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the workplace. Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662 (R.I. 1995). In responding to certain questions from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, we concluded in Cianci that the WCA's exclusive-remedy provision applied to bar a lawsuit in which the employee sought damages for, inter alia, work-related injuries
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