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Florence County School District #2 v. Interkal2/11/2002
mong Tortfeasors Act despite the operation of the Statute of Repose, was never ruled upon by the special referee. Because we are unable to discern what arguments were actually raised before the special referee and because the special referee did not rule upon the School District's current argument, it does not appear that this issue is preserved for review. See State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by the lower court in order to be preserved for appellate review). However, because of the equitable nature of the proceedings and the uncertainty regarding the issues actually raised and ruled upon, we address this issue. See State ex rel. Daniel v. Strong, 185 S.C. 27, 192 S.E. 671 (1937) (equity looks beneath the rigid rules of the law to seek justice).
When interpreting statutes, we are concerned with ascertaining and effectuating legislative intent if it reasonably can be discovered in the language when construed in light of its intended purpose. Singletary v. South Carolina Dep't of Educ., 316 S.C. 153, 447 S.E.2d 231 (Ct. App. 1994). "If a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation and the Court has no right to look for or impose another meaning." Lester v. South Carolina Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 334 S.C. 557, 561, 514 S.E.2d 751, 752 (1999).
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides that "where two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-20(A) (Supp. 2000). A right of contribution exists in favor of a tortfeasor who pays more than his pro rata share of the common liability. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-20(B) (Supp. 2000).
The South Carolina Statute of Repose provides that no action to "recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property may be brought more than thirteen years after substantial completion of such an improvement." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640 (Supp. 2000). The definition of an action "based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property includes:... an action for contribution or indemnification for damages sustained on account of an action described in this subdivision." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-640(6) (Supp. 2000).
In this case, the parties do not dispute that Altman's personal injury action arose more than thirteen years after the installation of the bleachers. The School District concedes the Statute of Repose applies to the underlying personal injury action against Interkal. Because the Statute of Repose specifically applies to actions for contribution, it is clear the General Assembly intended that persons who improve real property should be given the statutory right to protection from claims for contribution after the statutory period. We note that neighboring jurisdictions have similarly held a statute of repose bars any action for contribution after the statutory time period. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Kent & Assocs., Inc., 501 S.E.2d 858 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (claims for indemnification and contribution were among those contemplated by the legislature when it enacted the statue of repose); Krasaeath v. Parker, 441 S.E.2d 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice cases barred contribution claim even though suit was timely under the twenty-year statute of limitations governing contribution actions); New B
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