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Shelter Mutual Insurance Company v. Barton9/7/2001 ssue the question whether Vaden's negligence caused Barton to be legally entitled to recover under the uninsured-motorist provision of the contract, thereby defeating Barton's attempt to present a triable issue on the bad-faith claim.
Likewise, Barton did not eliminate any legal or factual defense to her claim for uninsured-motorist benefits based on Walters's negligence. We recognize that were we to apply Alabama law, the Alabama Guest Statute, § 32-1-2, Ala. Code 1975, would preclude any direct action by Barton against Walters for any negligence on his part in causing her injuries. However, we are constrained to interpret the policy in accordance with Missouri law.
Although Missouri has no guest statute, its courts have applied the guest statute of another state in an uninsured- motorist case that was factually similar to the case before us. In Byrn v. American Universal Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), Byrn's personal representatives sued her uninsured-motorist carrier for money damages for injuries arising from an automobile accident that occurred in Iowa. The driver of the vehicle in which Byrn was a passenger had no liability insurance. Unlike Missouri, Iowa had a guest statute. Iowa's guest statute provided that "an owner or operator of a car [would] not be liable for damage to a guest unless ... such damage was caused as a result of the reckless operation by him of such motor vehicle." Byrn, 548 S.W.2d at 187 (citing § 321.494 Iowa Code, 1975). The Missouri Court used the "most significant relationship" test outlined in § 145 of Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws to determine whether the Iowa guest statute or Missouri tort law should apply. The factors the Missouri court considered were:
"'(a) the place where the injury occurred,
"'(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
"'(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
"'(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.'" Byrn, 548 S.W.2d at 189, quoting § 145, Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws (1971).
Although Byrn was a resident of Missouri, the Missouri court held that the Iowa guest statute should apply because the driver resided in Iowa, the uninsured vehicle was registered in Iowa, the guest-host relationship was created in Iowa, and the accident occurred in Iowa. Accordingly, the Missouri court determined that Byrn's representatives were not "legally entitled to recover" damages under her uninsured-motorist policy.
Applying those same principles, we conclude that the Alabama guest statute should apply in this case. Although Walters was a Missouri resident and his vehicle was registered in Missouri, the guest-host relationship was created in Alabama and the accident occurred in Alabama. Thus, we will apply the Alabama Guest Statute, § 32-1-2, Ala. Code 1975, and applicable Alabama caselaw construing that statute.
Barton argues that she is an uninsured motorist pursuant to our holding in Hogan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 730 So. 2d 1157 (Ala. 1998) (overruled on other grounds, Williamson v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 741 So. 2d 1057 (Ala. 1999)). In Hogan, we read the provisions of the Alabama Guest Statute, § 32-1-2, Ala. Code 1975, in conjunction with the Uninsured Motorist Statute, § 32-7-23, Ala. Code 1975, and determined that a passenger who is precluded from recovery by the Alabama Guest Statute may nevertheless be "legally entitled to recover damages" from her own uninsured-motorist carrier. Hogan, 730 So. 2d at 1159. However, we did not hold in Hogan that a passenger may be "lega
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