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Shelter Mutual Insurance Company v. Barton9/7/2001
lly entitled to recover damages" under the uninsured- motorist provision of the driver's policy of insurance. Barton was not an "uninsured" under the Shelter policy, and our holding in Hogan, supra, does not make her one. Our holding in Hogan does nothing more than entitle Barton to recover under the uninsured-motorist provison of her own policy. To allow Barton to recover under a policy that Walters, the driver, had purchased and paid for would be to controvert the purpose and tenor of the Alabama Guest Statute. Thus, the only way Barton could recover uninsured-motorist benefits under the Shelter policy would be for her to step into Walters's shoes and establish that he was legally entitled to recover.
To establish that Barton was legally entitled to recover uninsured-motorist benefits under the policy, she must prove that Vaden's negligence proximately caused the accident. The jury rendered the following verdict:
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff Barton and against the defendant Shelter Mutual on the uninsured motorist claim and assess plaintiff's damages at $250,000.00, having found negligence by both Vaden and Walters."
The verdict form gave the jury the option of finding negligence on the part of Vaden or Walters, or both. Because the jury determined that both men were negligent, Alabama's contributory negligence laws prevent Walters from being "legally entitled to recover" under the uninsured-motorist provisions of the Shelter policy. Although the jury found Walters negligent in his operation of the vehicle, Walters's negligence is not imputed to Barton. See Adams v. Coffee County, 596 So. 2d 892, 895 (Ala. 1992)(to impute the negligence of the driver of an automobile to a passenger, the passenger must have had some authority or control over the car's movement). Because a factual issue remained as to which driver proximately caused Barton's injuries, the trial court properly submitted her breach-of-contract claim to the jury. Accordingly, because Barton was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on her breach-of-contract claim, the trial court erred by submitting Barton's bad-faith claim to a jury. II. Mental-Anguish Damages
Shelter also contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury on Alabama law regarding damages for breach-of-contract; it argues that the trial court should have instructed as to Missouri contract law. "The substantive rights of the parties under the contract are controlled by the law of the State ... where the contract was executed." New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 264 Ala. 137, 142, 85 So. 2d 441, 446 (1955). Because we have held that the Shelter policy must be construed in accordance with Missouri law, we likewise hold that Missouri law must be applied when considering the damages that resulted from a breach of that contract.
Under Missouri law, the damages recoverable in a breach- of-contract action are "those naturally resulting from the breach and which were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the contract for insurance was executed." Brion v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 651 S.W.2d 183, 184-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Our research reveals two limited circumstances under which the Missouri courts have allowed the recovery of mental-anguish damages arising from a breach of contract. In Golston v. Lincoln Cemetery, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978), the court allowed surviving family members to recover damages for mental anguish following the negligent burial of their relative, reasoning that "'in the case of interference with rights involving dead human bodies, ... mental anguish to the surviving relatives is not only the natural and probable consequence of the character of wron
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