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S Development Company v. Pima Capital Management Co.8/30/2001
." Norwest Bank (Minn.), N.A. v. Symington, 197 Ariz. 181, 189, 36, 3 P.3d 1101, 1109 (App. 2000). This means that "compensation for an injury received from a collateral source fully independent of the wrongdoer does not operate to reduce the damages recoverable from the wrongdoer." Burrington v. Gila County, 159 Ariz. 320, 325-26, 767 P.2d 43, 48-49 (App. 1988) (emphasis added).
Even if we were to assume that the appellees received the settlement funds based upon the same injury that the appellants are alleged to have caused, it is clear that the manufacturer of the pipe and the appellants are independent of each other and any benefit received from the manufacturers is collateral to the damages allegedly caused by the appellants. We disagree with the appellants that it does not matter "that [the appellees] asserted different claims against [the appellants] in this case." The injury resulting from the actions of the manufacturer by negligently manufacturing the PB pipe and the injury caused by the appellants due to the nondisclosure of a defective condition of the property are only related in that the defective condition was the plumbing--two completely unrelated torts with unrelated measures of damage.
Moreover, even if the appellants are correct in their assertion that the collateral source rule does not apply, the fact that the appellees received settlement funds from a product liability suit is irrelevant to the damages issue asserted in the appellees' cause of action for nondisclosure against the appellants. That is, the evidence of the settlement proceeds for repairs would have been irrelevant because the appellees' measure of damages was the difference between what the appellees paid for the buildings and what the buildings were worth at the time of the sale, including the defective plumbing. Subsequent receipt of monies from a third party and ensuing repairs do not affect that measure of damage. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding that evidence from the trial.
V. The Trial Court's Preclusion of the Appellants' Offer to Rescind the Purchase Contracts
The appellants next argue that the trial court erred by precluding the introduction of the appellants' offer to rescind the purchase contracts, which they assert is relevant to the issue of the appellees' duty to mitigate damages. We disagree. The appellees moved in limine to preclude the appellants from introducing the offer to rescind the purchase contracts and the trial court granted the motion. We need look no further than our rules of evidence to determine that the trial court was well within its discretion in precluding the evidence. See Brown, 194 Ariz. at 88, 7, 977 P.2d at 810.
Rule 408 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence precludes the introduction of offers to compromise:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Ariz. R. Evid. 408 (emphasis added).
The appellants argue that the evidence of the settlement offer is directly related to the appellees' duty to mitigate damages, that is, had the appellees accepted the settlement offer, the appellees would not have incurred the damages that it sought as a product of this lawsuit. The appellants' argument pertains directly to the amount of the appellees' claim. Tribby v. Northwestern Bank of Great Falls, 704 P.2d 409, 417 (Mont. 1985) ("We are not persuaded by the contention that refusing an offer to settle i
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