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Hudick v. hastings Mutual Insurance Co.9/25/2001
FOR PUBLICATION
9:20 a.m.
Defendant appeals by right the trial court's orders granting plaintiff's motion for summary disposition, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (C)(10), and denying defendant's motions for summary disposition and reconsideration. We affirm.
On February 19, 1997, plaintiff was severely injured when his two-wheel vehicle collided with a van. Because plaintiff lived with his parents, their no-fault insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, began paying plaintiff's personal injury protection (PIP) benefits on a coordinated basis. Defendant, which insured the van under a policy that did not coordinate medical benefits, had been notified of the accident and the serious nature of plaintiff's injuries. As early as March 18, 1997, defendant believed that it was the primary insurer under the no-fault law, but it actively withheld this belief from plaintiff's attorney and Allstate. On October 29, 1997, after it was determined that the vehicle that plaintiff was operating was a "motorcycle" under the no-fault act, defendant advised plaintiff's attorney that it would assume responsibility for plaintiff's first- party benefits.
On May 13, 1998, plaintiff's attorney sent a letter to defendant's claim representative, noting that payment of first-party benefits was not coordinated under defendant's policy and demanding payment from defendant for hospital expenses incurred by plaintiff between February 19, 1997, and March 14, 1997. Defendant denied payment on May 20, 1998, because all of the expenses were incurred more than one year before the request for payment. Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 10, 1998.
Both parties filed motions for summary disposition. The trial court found that a letter plaintiff's attorney sent on February 27, 1997, which was written in conjunction with plaintiff's third-party case against the driver of the van and its owner, provided defendant with written notice of the catastrophic injury plaintiff sustained and allowed the insurer to assess its liability while the claim was relatively fresh. The court further noted that any limitation on defendant's ability to obtain further information was caused by defendant concealing its belief that it was the primary PIP carrier. Nonetheless, defendant was able to assess its liability as early as March 18, 1997, when it advised the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association that it was the carrier and had set the medical reserve at $300,000. The court further disputed defendant's argument that even if written notice of injury were given, the one-year back rule should not be tolled because plaintiff did not make a "specific claim for benefits." Although plaintiff did not initially submit the medical bills directly to defendant, he timely submitted them to Allstate. Plaintiff did not submit the bills directly to defendant because defendant did not advise either Allstate or plaintiff that it was the proper carrier. The court granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and denied defendant's motion.
The trial court's rulings on motions for summary disposition are reviewed de novo. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Absent disputed questions of fact, whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations is a question of law that this Court also reviews de novo. Titan Ins Co v Farmers Ins Exchange, 241 Mich App 258, 260; 615 NW2d 774 (2000).
Defendant argues that it was entitled to summary disposition under the limitations period imposed by MCL 500.3145(1), because defendant did not receive "notice" of plaintiff's injury within one year of the accident, and plaintiff's May 13, 1998, claim for medical expens
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