Clifton v. Wegrecki9/11/2001
UNPUBLISHED
Defendant Central Distributors of Beer, Inc. (Central), appeals by leave granted, and plaintiff cross-appeals from a circuit court order granting in part and denying in part Central's amended motion for summary disposition. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Central, a wholesale liquor licensee, supplied kegs of beer in a refrigerated truck with taps for a company picnic held at Hines Park. It is undisputed that the picnic's sponsors, ACI Carron and the UAW (collectively, "the company"), did not obtain a one-day license for serving the beer. Defendant Joseph Wegrecki attended the picnic and allegedly drank beer supplied by Central and served by someone hired by the company. After leaving the picnic in his automobile, Wegrecki allegedly ran a red light and struck plaintiff's decedent's vehicle. Plaintiff's decedent died as a result of her injuries.
On appeal, Central argues that the trial court erred in denying its amended motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiff's claim under MCL 436.44 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act, MCL 436.1 et seq., because § 44 did not create a basis for an independent cause of action against Central. We review a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Plaintiff sought to impose civil liability upon Central, on the basis of its alleged violation of the former MCL 436.19d, through § 44, which provided as follows:
Any person engaged in the business of selling or keeping for sale alcoholic liquor in violation of the provisions of this act, whether as owner, clerk, agent, servant or employe, shall be equally liable, as principal, both civilly and criminally, for the violation of the provisions of this act, or any person or principal shall be liable, both civilly and criminally, for the acts of his clerk, servant, agent or employe, for the violation of the provisions of this act.
Whether § 44, in and of itself, created a civil cause of action is a question of statutory interpretation. The primary goal of judicial statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is presumed that the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).
We find that the language of § 44 is clear and unambiguous, and therefore presume that the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed in the statute. Sun Valley, supra at 236. Under the plain language of § 44, owners, agents, and employees may be held equally liable, both civilly and criminally, for violations of the act. Thus, for example, under § 44 an owner may be held liable for its agent's or employee's violation of the act. However, the language of § 44 does not, as proposed by plaintiff, create a separate cause of action under which an injured person may seek personal injury damages for a wholesale licensee's alleged negligence in vio
Page 1 2 3 Michigan Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|