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Huttner v. State9/4/2001
d (Minn. Aug. 4, 1993)). Generally actions for wrongful death must be brought within three years after the decedent's death. Minn. Stat. § 573.02, subd. 1 (1996). Under an exception to this rule, however,
n action to recover damages for a death caused by an intentional act constituting murder may be commenced at any time after the death of decedent. Id.
Huttner did not serve Ramsey County or Fischer within three years after Fenske's death. The district court held that the legislature intended the murder exception to apply only to claims against the murderer and not to claims against others possibly liable for the murderer's actions on negligence theories.
Although the district court may be correct about the legislature's intentions, the statute's language contains no such limitation. And neither legislative intent nor legislative history is relevant when, as here, the language of a statute is unambiguous. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1996) (stating when words of a law are "clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit"). The supreme court has stated:
Our statutes provide for an action for the wrongful death of a person, vesting it in the personal representative for the benefit of the next of kin. One cause of action is created, and one only, and all persons whose wrongful act contributed to cause the death may be joined as defendants therein. Almquist v. Wilcox, 115 Minn. 37, 39, 131 N.W. 796, 796 (1911) (referring to a prior version of the current wrongful-death statute).
Clearly, an action to recover damages for a death caused by murder may be brought against persons other than the one(s) who actually inflict death. The plain language of the murder-exception to the three-year limitation does not limit its application to the person(s) who commit the murder. To read the exception as only applicable to the murderer(s) would be to improperly read a provision into the statute that the legislature did not include. See Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963) ("If there is to be a change in the statute, it must come from the legislature, for the courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposefully omits or inadvertently overlooks."); Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that "the task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but does not fall to this court"), review denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987).
Persuasive as the district court's reasoning may be, we are constrained to interpret the law as written. Huttner's wrongful-death action against Fischer and the county is an action to recover damages for a death caused by an intentional act constituting murder, and as such, may be commenced at any time after the death of the decedent. The claims are not barred by failure to serve Fischer and the county within three years after Fenske's death. Summary judgment for Fischer and the county based on the statute of limitations is reversed and this aspect of the case is remanded for further proceedings.
II. Official Immunity
Where summary judgment sought on grounds of non-federal official immunity is denied, the order denying the summary judgment is immediately appealable. McGovern v. City of Minneapolis, 475 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Minn. 1991). Whether government entities and employees are protected by official immunity is a legal question which appellate courts review de novo. Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. 1996).
The common law doctrine of official immunity provides that a public official who is charged by law with duties calling for the exerc
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