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Gunderson v. Harrington9/6/2001
to the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA should apply. The intentional injury exception was first recognized in Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930) where the employer swung a heavy broom handle at the employee, dislocating two finger joints. We stated:
No case has been cited where it has been held that one who willfully assaults and injures a workman while in the course of his employment, be he an employe , employer or a stranger, when sued for the tort, can successfully interpose as a defense that the plaintiff and his employer are under the workmen's compensation act, and his sole remedy is thereunder. And we think none can be found, for it would be a perversion of the purpose of the act so to hold. 180 Minn. at 471, 231 N.W. at 233-34.
In Breimhorst v. Beckman, we rejected a claim under the intentional injury exception where the employee failed to present a triable issue of fact regarding whether the employer had "conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury, and such intent may not be inferred from mere negligence, though it be gross." 227 Minn. 409, 426, 35 N.W.2d 719, 730 (1949) (holding that the exclusive remedy for employee's injury from concealed spring gun on employer's premises was under the WCA.
Later in Hildebrandt v. Whirlpool Corp. we rejected the argument that an employer's knowledge of a "substantial certainty" of injury to an employee should trigger the intentional injury exception and reiterated the "conscious and deliberate intent to inflict injury" standard. 364 N.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting a claim under the intentional injury exception where employees presented evidence that the employer intentionally misrepresented the nature of a toxic chemical employees were required to handle). Most recently in Kaess v. Armstrong Cork Co. we stated again that a "conscious and deliberate intent to inflict injury" is necessary for the intentional injury exception to apply. 403 N.W.2d 643, 644-45 (Minn. 1987) (dismissing an action in strict liability for injuries sustained through employee's work with insulation materials containing asbestos manufactured by the employer).
To successfully oppose summary judgment Gunderson must identify material facts in the record creating a genuine issue as to whether Harrington consciously and deliberately intended to injure her. The stated purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure—securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of an action—is furthered by allowing a court to dispose of an action on the merits if there is no genuine dispute regarding the material facts, and a party is entitled to judgment under the law applicable to such facts. Minn. R. Civ. P. 1, 56.03. To raise a genuine issue of material fact, Gunderson must provide more than "evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and which is not sufficiently probative with respect to an essential element of case to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions." DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997). She has failed to do so.
While Gunderson alleges that Harrington struck her on five different occasions, as to the first incident she testified that she did not think Harrington intended to injure her, and as to the next three incidents she testified that she did not know if he intended to hurt her. She characterized them as "little swats on the head," failed to mention the first three incidents to anyone, and sought no medical treatment for the first four incidents. As to the incident on July 10, 1998 she gave conflicting testimony, at first saying that "with the force of the hit, I think it was intentional," but later saying she
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