Calcaterra v. Montana Resources9/20/2001
enial of Karen's Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., motion an abuse of discretion?
Karen's motion for relief from judgment was premised on Sherner. She contended in the District Court-and contends on appeal-that Sherner substantially changed the definition of "intentional and malicious" with respect to the exclusivity provision of the Act, and that she is entitled to relief from the dismissal of her case and application of that new definition under Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. Montana Resources does not dispute that we changed the definition of "intentional and malicious" in Sherner. It argues, however, that Calcaterra is the law of Karen's case and Sherner does not meet the extraordinary circumstances requirement for relieving Karen from the earlier dismissal of her case under Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. We agree.
"Under the doctrine of law of the case, a prior decision of this Court resolving a particular issue between the same parties in the same case is binding and cannot be relitigated." State v. Gilder, 2001 MT 121, 9, 305 Mont. 362, 9, ___P.3d___, 9.
The purpose of the law of the case doctrine is to promote judicial economy and prevent the never-ending litigation of a single case (Gilder, 10) and the doctrine has a long jurisprudential basis in Montana. See, e.g., Carlson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1929), 86 Mont. 78, 81, 281 P. 913, 914.
The parties in the present case do not dispute the fact that we expressly determined in Calcaterra the issue of whether Karen's proof met the "intentional and malicious act" exception to the exclusive remedy of the Act. Indeed, we specifically concluded therein that she raised no genuine factual issue as to whether Carl's injuries and death were caused by an intentional and malicious act or omission. See Calcaterra, 22.
Karen correctly argues, however, that the doctrine of law of the case is not inviolable and that there may be exceptions to the application of the doctrine. See Gilder, 13 (citing Carlson, 86 Mont. at 81, 281 P.2d at 914).
She contends in this regard that our decision in Sherner created extraordinary circumstances justifying an exception to the doctrine under Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P. We disagree.
Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., applies at all only if extraordinary circumstances exist. Bahm v. Southworth, 2000 MT 244, 14, 301 Mont. 434, 14, 10 P.3d 99, 14.
However, "a change in the decisional law subsequent to a final judgment does not represent extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b) so as to allow reopening of that judgment." In re Marriage of Waters (1986), 223 Mont.183, 187, 724 P.2d 726, 729. Moreover, we held in another Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., case that "when a decisional law change occurs, subsequent to final judgment in a particular case, the 'law of the case' is that final judgment should not be altered." Fiscus v. Beartooth Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1979), 180 Mont. 434, 442, 591 P.2d 196, 200. Thus, while Karen argues that the revised Sherner definition of "intentional and malicious" constitutes extraordinary circumstances meriting relief from the final judgment in Calcaterra under Rule 60(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., our cases simply do not support her argument. Nor does she distinguish those cases in any concrete way.
We hold that the denial of Karen's Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
JIM REGNIER
JAMES C. NELSON
PATRICIA COTTER
W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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