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Butterfield v. Sidney Public School8/30/2001
e was or was at least "regarded as" physically disabled.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and reinstate the final agency decision of the Montana Department of Labor and Industry.
TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:
W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
PATRICIA COTTER
JIM REGNIER
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion. I agree with the Court that the issue before us is whether the District Court erred when it affirmed the Commission's conclusion that Butterfield is not disabled or regarded by his employer as disabled. I also agree that the law cited by the Court is correct. I submit, however, that the Court attributes to the hearing examiner findings never made and ignores findings actually made. A proper analysis of the law and the record in this case requires this Court to affirm the District Court. I would do so.
With regard to the hearing examiner's findings, they do not include--as the Court would have the reader believe--a finding that Butterfield is disabled. The hearing examiner did make extensive findings of fact. He followed those findings with an Opinion containing his legal analysis, concluding therein that Butterfield was disabled and that he was regarded as disabled by the School District. These are the conclusions the Commission determined were incorrect as a matter of law. They also are the conclusions the District Court determined were incorrect as a matter of law in affirming the Commission's decision on judicial review. In my opinion, as discussed below, the Commission and the District Court were correct.
The Court also states that the hearing examiner "found that [Butterfield] is significantly restricted in the ability to perform that class of jobs which requires heavy physical labor, or at least that his employer regarded him as so restricted." While such a finding, if supported by substantial evidence, would mandate a conclusion that Butterfield is disabled, the fact is that no such finding is contained in the hearing examiner's extensive findings of fact.
With regard to other findings, the Court is correct that Butterfield received releases to return to work in June and July, with restrictions from Dr. Cooper of no heavy lifting, limited back movement and limited use of his left shoulder, and with restrictions from Dr. Ben-Youssef from heavy lifting and lifting with his left shoulder and to light duty back movement. Important findings omitted by the Court are that Dr. Cooper modified his release of Butterfield to return to work in August of 1997, defining no heavy lifting as "over approximately 50 pounds" and that, while Butterfield continued to maintain he could perform his job within the restrictions, the School District believed "he could not perform the essential functions of his job." (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, and on the basis that Butterfield could not perform his job, the School District effectively terminated his employment.
Turning, then, to an analysis of the case before us, we all agree that, to succeed with his claim of employment discrimination, Butterfield must establish he has a physical disability, that is, a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities or a condition regard by the School District as such an impairment. See ยง 49-2-101(19)(a), MCA. We also agree that he can meet this standard only by proving that his impairment precludes him from either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. See Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp. (9th Cir. 1997), 121 F.3d 537, 540. The Commission concluded Butterf
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