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Butterfield v. Sidney Public School8/30/2001
ield did not meet his burden and the District Court affirmed. The judicial standard of review of an agency's conclusion of law on a mixed question of law and fact is whether the determination is correct. Maguire v. State (1992), 254 Mont. 178, 182, 835 P.2d 755, 757-58.
On a careful review of the record before us, it is irrefutable that Butterfield has not established the elements of his cause of action against the School District. It is not disputed that Butterfield has a "bad back." It also is not disputed that the School District effectively terminated Butterfield's employment because it believed his back condition left him unable to perform his job . As set forth above, however, this is not enough to establish employment discrimination based on physical disability.
An employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee incapable of satisfying the demands of a particular job . Hafner, 268 Mont. at 402, 886 P.2d at 951 (citation omitted). Pursuant to the "substantially limits" a major life activity element contained in ยง 49-2-101(19)(a), MCA, and in the EEOC Interpretative Guidelines on which the Court relies, Butterfield must establish that he is precluded from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. The record is clear in this case that he has not done so. Indeed, the hearing examiner's findings contain nothing which could be stretched to even relate to this requirement. Moreover, it is not surprising that Butterfield did not make this showing; his position from the outset of his back-related problems at work through the time the School District terminated his employment and afterwards was that he could perform his job. Illustrative of his position is Butterfield's testimony at the agency hearing on his claim that, after leaving the School District, he sought a variety of jobs which were as physically demanding as his former job with the School District and felt he could do the work.
The Court cites to no finding actually made by the hearing examiner in this regard. The purported "finding" on which the Court relies--that Butterfield "is significantly restricted in the ability to perform that class of jobs which requires heavy physical labor, or at least that his employer regarded him as so restricted"--does not appear in the findings of the hearing examiner. In addition, while the EEOC Interpretative Guidelines quoted by the Court include as an example that an individual with a back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the physical condition eliminates the ability to perform a class of jobs, the critical language is "a back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job." (Emphasis aded.) The guideline does not state, imply or even suggest that every "back condition" prevents an individual from performing any heavy labor job. That is the very proof a plaintiff like Butterfield must bring forward and it is the very proof which in this case simply was not presented.
Finally, the present case is not "practically indistinguishable" from Hafner. There, as the Court points out, the personnel director testified that the plaintiff could not perform the position at issue and "could not be considered for further employment." No such evidence in support of the "substantially limits" element was outlined in any finding by the hearing examiner in the present case. Indeed, as noted above, the School District terminated Butterfield because he could not perform his job . Such a determination does not equate to
the School District regarding Butterfield as disabled. See Hafner, 268 Mont.
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