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Boyd v. S.E. Johnson Co.9/10/2001 cular purpose. See R.C. 1302.27 & 1302.28. Neither of these two warranties arise as the result of an express agreement between the manufacturer or merchant of goods and the consumer. Rather, both warranties arise solely by operation of the law.
R.C. 1302.27 provides for the implied warranty of merchantability. R.C. 1302.27 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(A)Unless excluded or modified as provided in section 1302.29 of the Revised code, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. * * *
R.C. 1302.28 provides for implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose. It states in pertinent part, as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under section 1302.29 of the Revised Code an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
In this case, the appellant based its claim against Compaction America and The McLean Company on a theory of breach of implied warranty. The appellant, however, alleged no set of facts giving rise to such a breach of a duty. Therefore, under the standards of Civ.R. 56(C), Compaction America and The McLean Company were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the appellant's second assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled.
4. The trial court committed error in granting appellee The McLean Co.'s motion for summary judgment as appellant's supplier liability claims were legally sufficient pursuant to Civ.R. 56.
In her fourth assignment of error, the appellant maintains that the trial court erred in finding that no genuine issues of material fact remain to be litigated with respect to her claim against the distributor of the roller, The McLean Company. Specifically, the appellant alleges that a genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated as to whether The McLean Company acted as a reasonably prudent supplier/seller would have acted under similar circumstances. Having rejected the appellant's previous claims that the roller was defective in design, we cannot say that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial with respect to this issue. Therefore, the appellant's argument has no merit.
Accordingly, the appellant's fourth and final assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled.
Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
SHAW, J. concurs in judgment only.
BRYANT, J. concurs in judgment only.
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