 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Bray v. Marathon Corporation9/10/2001
4, 436, 454 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1995).
As noted above, a cause of action in strict liability under section 15-78-10 is a legislatively created "entirely new species of action" which "renders irrelevant the concept of duty in the traditional setting of tort liability, for recovery may be had even though a seller 'has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.'" Schall, 278 S.C. at 648-49, 300 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting S.C. Code Ann. ยง 15-73-10 (1976)). The doctrine of strict liability in tort was not a part of the common law of South Carolina. Hatfield v. Atlas Enters., Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 248, 262 S.E.2d 900, 900-01 (1980). Our supreme court adopted the Kinard analysis expressly in connection with a negligence cause of action.
As our supreme court stated in Barnwell, " here the legislature has, by statute, acted upon a subject, the judiciary is limited to interpretation and construction of that statute." 301 S.C. at 537, 393 S.E.2d at 163. "It is perhaps unnecessary to say that Courts have no legislative powers . . . . They cannot read into a statute something that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the statute itself." Id. at 538, 393 S.E.2d at 163. The application of the Kinard requirements in a strict liability cause of action would be impermissible legislating. We therefore decline to apply the Kinard analysis in this setting. To the extent it is desirable public policy to impose the requirement of a close relationship in the context of a strict liability cause of action, that is a decision for our legislature to make.
Because the statute limits liability to the user or consumer, we perceive no need for a limitation on foreseeable victims to avoid disproportionate liability as our supreme court found necessary in a bystander setting. As Bray argues, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the user of a product might suffer emotional damage if the use of the defective product results in death or serious injury to a third person, irrespective of the relationship between the user and the third person. This argument is in accord with the premise underlying the Act, which recognizes that the cost of injuries which flow from a "product defect" should be borne by the manufacturer or seller rather than the ultimate user. Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 316 S.C. 452, 456, 450 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1994). CONCLUSION
Bray's negligence claim fails to fulfill the requirements of Kinard, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment on that cause of action. However, the trial court erred by superimposing the bystander analysis of Kinard to this statutorily created strict liability cause of action. Therefore, the decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.
CONNOR and HUFF, JJ., concur.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 South Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|