Damone v. Damone9/14/2001
ll, offering two reasons why the agreement was not to control the disposition of the settlement proceeds. One was that the agreement did not specifically state that it would "override all other considerations relevant to an 'equitable division' in the context of the divorce action," and the other was that "the approach of accepting various independent agreements at face value could easily lead to an inequitable result," causing in this case a "grossly disproportionate property division."
The court concluded that neither of the aforementioned options were acceptable, because " lthough it is appropriate to recognize that Phillip deserves compensation for his pain and suffering, it is also appropriate to recognize Robin's contributions to the marriage, and to leave her in a reasonable financial position to provide a home for herself and for the children." Instead, stating that it favored transactional efficiency and avoiding future litigation, the court fashioned the property settlement at issue, disregarding the parties' agreement. The court reiterated that this was intended to be an equitable division of the marital estate which would reflect defendant's continuing pain and suffering, both parties' contributions to the marriage, and, quoting Naumann v. Kurz, 152 Vt. 355, 360, 566 A.2d 1342, 1345 (1989), would provide both spouses "with a nest egg for retirement or a reserve for emergencies."
" trial court has wide discretion in the disposition of marital property upon divorce, and we will affirm its decision where we find reasonable evidence to support the court's findings and conclusions." Johnson v. Johnson, 155 Vt. 36, 43, 580 A.2d 503, 507 (1990). "We will not disturb that disposition unless the court's discretion was abused, withheld or exercised on untenable grounds or to a clearly unreasonable extent." Milligan v. Milligan, 158 Vt. 436, 439, 613 A.2d 1281, 1283 (1992) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Whether a court should recognize a divorcing parties' independently-arrived-at property settlement agreements is an issue which is not unique to this case. We have repeatedly recognized that parties to a divorce may enter into agreements reflecting their preferred disposition of marital property. See Tudhope v. Riehle, 167 Vt. 174, 177, 704 A.2d 765, 767 (1997); Putnam v. Putnam, 166 Vt. 108, 113, 689 A.2d 446, 449 (1996); Kanaan v. Kanaan, 163 Vt. 402, 413, 659 A.2d 128, 135 (1995); Bendekgey v. Bendekgey, 154 Vt. 193, 197, 576 A.2d 433, 435 (1990); White v. White, 141 Vt. 499, 502, 450 A.2d 1108, 1110 (1982). We have also recognized the deference a court should give to agreements entered into between divorcing parties. "We have a strong policy in favor of voluntary settlement of marital disputes where appropriate." Bendekgey, 154 Vt. at 197, 576 A.2d at 435; see also Lewis v. Lewis, 149 Vt. 19, 22, 538 A.2d 170, 172 (1987) (when disposing of marital property, "trial court should give great weight to any agreements between the parties"); Barbour v. Barbour, 146 Vt. 506, 510, 505 A.2d 1217, 1219 (1986) (agreements regarding stipulations to property division will not be lightly overturned). While a trial court does have very broad discretion in its power to distribute marital property, " hat discretion is narrowed, however, where the parties have made an agreement to distribute all or part of their property." Bendekgey, 154 Vt. at 197, 576 A.2d at 435. "A pretrial agreement to distribute property is a contract, which the court can set aside only for grounds sufficient to set aside a contract." Id. Such agreements are presumed to be fair, formal, and binding, representing the result of the bargaining process, and therefore will not lightly be set aside. Id. at 197-98, 576 A
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Vermont Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|