Miller v. Jackson Hospital and Clinic8/11/2000
Roy Lee Miller ("Roy Lee"), on January 14, 1997, while hospitalized at Jackson Hospital, suffered severe burns over a large portion of his body. On February 19, 1997, Roy Lee executed a durable power of attorney in favor of Charles Miller ("Charles"), his uncle. The power of attorney gave Charles, among other things, the authority to "institute, prosecute, defend, compromise, arbitrate and dispose of legal, equitable, or administrative hearings, actions, suits, attachments, arrests, distresses, or other proceedings, or otherwise engage in litigation in connection with any legal or equitable matters."
On January 11, 1999, just three days before the statutory limitations period would have run on Roy Lee's personal-injury claims arising from his burns, Charles filed a medical-malpractice action captioned "Charles Miller, on behalf of Roy Lee Miller v. Jackson Hospital and Clinic, Raghu Mukkamala, M.D., Glenn Yates, M.D., and Primary Care Internists of Montgomery." The complaint alleged that negligence on the part of the defendants had caused Roy Lee's injuries.
All defendants moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment, on the basis that Charles, as named in the complaint, was not the real party in interest, as required by Rule 17, Ala. R. Civ. P. On August 16, 1999, after the expiration of the limitations period, Charles moved to amend the complaint by adding Roy Lee as a named plaintiff. On August 19, 1999, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The court denied Charles's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment, ruling that Charles was not the real party in interest.
The trial court determined that Charles did not have the authority to sue on behalf of Roy Lee because the power of attorney did not specifically address Charles's bringing a personal-injury tort action on behalf of Roy Lee. The trial court also held that because Charles was not the real party in interest, he did not have standing to file the action on behalf of Roy Lee and, thus, that the court had never had jurisdiction over the case. Because the limitations period had run before the complaint was amended to add Roy Lee, the court held, there was no valid complaint to which the amendment could relate back pursuant to Rule 17(a).
First, we must determine whether the power of attorney executed by Roy Lee vested Charles with the authority to file a personal-injury action for the benefit of Roy Lee. Second, if it gave Charles that authority, we must decide whether Charles was a real party in interest, for purposes of Rule 17(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. Third, if Charles was not a real party in interest, then we must determine whether the complaint could be amended to name Roy Lee as the real party in interest or to substitute him for Charles, subject to the provisions of Rule 17(a) allowing relation back of such an amendment.
I. Standard of Review
This Court will review a summary judgment de novo, and it will apply the same standard the trial court applied. Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860 (Ala. 1988). A summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P.
II. Effectiveness of the Durable Power of Attorney
A. Whether the Power of Attorney was Ineffective for Want of Specificity.
The trial court held that the power of attorney gave Charles no authority to sue on behalf of Roy Lee because, it found, the power to file a personal-injury action was not specifically stated within the powers described in the document. In support of this con
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