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Gibbs v. State of Alabama Department of Industrial Realtions7/28/2000
rker dies from a work-related injury.
"In other words, if a worker is entitled to receive workers' compensation disability benefits, but dies of an unrelated cause, his dependents are entitled to those benefits, or to the maximum amount of benefits they would have received had he died of a work-related injury , whichever amount is lower." Chatham Steel Corp., __ So. 2d at __.
Under the statute, when a worker dies from a cause unrelated to his work-related injury , in order for the worker's dependents to be entitled to recover benefits, the amount of the worker's disability benefits he was entitled to must have been established. In denying the dependents benefits, the trial court found that "there was no agreement as to the amount of future payments due or to any specific degree of disability, therefore [that there was] no balance of payments due." However, under 25-5-57(a)(5), an agreement is not required when the court has ascertained the degree of permanent total disability. In Vann Express, Inc. v. Phillips, 539 So. 2d 296, 297 (Ala. 1988), discussing § 25-5-57(a)(5) and the phrase "judicially ascertained," our supreme court stated: " e find the phrase `judicially ascertained' to require that a court of competent jurisdiction consider the matter and then enter a final order setting forth the extent of the injured employee's disability." The Alabama Supreme Court further stated that the "particular statutory language reflects legislative intent to insure that disability determinations not be made following an employee's death." Phillips, 539 So. 2d at 297.
In July 1994, the court entered an order finding that in 1992 the worker had suffered previous injuries and that he had sustained a 15% permanent disability for the loss of his left eye; a 21% permanent partial impairment for an injury to his right leg; and a 64% permanent impairment for a back and spinal-cord injury. After sustaining these injuries, Gibbs suffered an additional injury for which he sought compensation from the SITF. In its 1994 order, the court further stated that the worker was "entitled to be paid pursuant to the Second Injury Trust Fund for total permanent disability as set out hereafter." The court ordered that he receive $165 per week from the SITF, until December 1997. At that time, the SITF was to pay the worker $385 per week throughout his disability.
SITF argues that because the order provides that SITF was to pay the worker benefits "throughout his disability," SITF's obligation ceased when the worker's disability ceased. SITF argues that his disability ended at his death. Thus, SITF claims the dependents are not entitled to any further payments. This argument is directly contrary to the language and the legislative intent of § 25-5-57(a)(5).
The trial court erred in holding that the worker's dependents were not entitled to benefits under § 25-5-57(a)(5). Therefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Robertson, P.J., and Yates J., concur.
Crawley and Thompson, JJ., dissent.
THOMPSON, Judge, dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissents in Chatham Steel Corp. v. Shadinger, [Ms. 2980294, May 21, 1999] So. 2d
(Ala. Civ. App. 1999) and Drummond Co. v. Lolley, [Ms. 2990131, June 23, 2000] So. 2d (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
Crawley, J., concurs.
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