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Prudential Ballard Realty Company7/28/2000
certainly not least, the public are entitled to a compass to guide them in this exceedingly difficult area.
I believe we should endorse, as a general rule, a presumptively reasonable benchmark that is pegged to a range rather than a specific number. I recognize that dulling the bright line may lead to an equally offensive vagueness, but at this stage of our walk down this path I prefer to err in that direction. A general rule of preference for single-digit benchmarks serves society's dual needs for adequacy of standards while effectively meeting the goals of deterrence and punishment in civil cases. The use of a range of single-digit benchmarks has impeccable credentials.
We should not, however, embrace single-digit benchmarks without recognizing the need for an exception where necessary to prevent a range of wrongdoing from escaping accountability. Justice Houston's solution of allowing $20,000 in punitive damages to pass muster without regard to the ratio reflects commendable sensitivity to the problem of making wrongdoers accountable in those cases where a plaintiff has only a modest claim for compensatory damages. I suggest that we deal with the problem by recognizing in such cases the propriety of multipliers sufficiently high so that both the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney will have adequate incentive to secure accountability for reprehensible conduct. Without such an approach, a well-financed and litigious defendant could easily make the presumptive floor of $20,000 highly unattractive to both the plaintiff and the plaintiff's counsel.
Litigation costs are a traditional factor to be applied in gauging the excessiveness of punitive damages. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Parker, 726 So. 2d 619, 624 (Ala. 1998). We should announce that we are prepared to mute a defendant's shrill claims of "sticker shock" in instances of high ratios resulting from modest claims for compensatory damages by taking into account high litigation costs. Our end should be accountability for reprehensible conduct, even where compensatory damages are small, by creating a climate where the public knows that this Court will uphold a punitive-damages award in an amount sufficient to justify a plaintiff's risk, effort, and inconvenience in being a party to civil litigation and, at the same time, fairly compensate the plaintiff's attorney for the risk and effort necessary to obtain such a result.
Cook, J., concurs.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion in the context of a very valuable aspect of Justice Houston's special writing. Specifically, I concur in Justice Houston's recommendation that we establish a punitive-damages benchmark of the greater of either $20,000 or three times the actual harm caused by the tort, with the burden on the plaintiff to justify any deviation above the benchmark and the burden on the defendant to justify a remittitur that would deviate below the benchmark. I recognize that the $20,000 alternative of the benchmark may require some reevaluation over time or in peculiar cases. SEE, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority's opinion conditioning its affirmance on the plaintiff's acceptance of a remittitur of the punitive-damages award; however, I believe the punitive-damages award, even as reduced to $750,000, is excessive. I agree that a punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 3:1 is a useful benchmark for analyzing whether a punitive-damages award is excessive, see Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 535 (Ala. 1997) (See, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but an award based on that ratio is only presumptively reasonabl
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