Crichfield v. Grand Wailea Company7/31/2000
reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992) (citation omitted). As we have often articulated:
ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 56(c) (1990). "A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties." Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 61, 647 P.2d 713, 716 (1982) (citations omitted).
Konno v. County of Hawaii, 85 Hawaii 61, 70, 937 P.2d 397, 406 (1997) (quoting Dunlea v. Dappen, 83 Hawaii 28, 36, 924 P.2d 196, 204 (1996) (brackets in original). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." State ex rel. Bronster v. Yoshina, 84 Hawaii 179, 186, 932 P.2d 316, 323 (1997) (citing Maguire v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 79 Hawaii 110, 112, 899 P.2d 393, 395 (1995)). In other words, "we must view all of the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to [the party opposing the motion]." Maguire, 79 Hawaii at 112, 899 P.2d at 395 (citation omitted).
Taylor v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 90 Hawaii 302, 305-06, 978 P.2d 740, 743-44 (1999) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murata, 88 Hawaii 284, 287-88, 965 P.2d 1284, 1287-88 (1998) (quoting Estate of Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 86 Hawaii 262, 269-70, 948 P.2d 1103, 1110-11 (1997))) (brackets in original).
B. Statutory Interpretation
" he interpretation of a statute . . . is a question of law reviewable de novo." . . .Arceo, 84 Hawaii 10, 928 P.2d 852 . . . (quoting State v. Camara, 81 Hawaii 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted)). See also State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawaii 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995); State v. Higa, 79 Hawaii 1, 3, 897 P.2d 928, 930 . . . (1995); State v. Nakata, 76 Hawaii 360, 365, 878 P.2d 699, 704 . . . (1994). . . . Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, 84 Hawaii 138, 144, 931 P.2d 580, 586 (1997) (some brackets added and some in original). See also State v. Soto, 84 Hawaii 229, 236, 933 P.2d 66, 73 (1997).
Furthermore, our statutory construction is guided by established rules:
When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. . . .
In construing an ambiguous statute, " he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." HRS ยง 1-15(1) [(1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool. Gray, 84 Hawaii at 148, 931 P.2d at 590 (quoting . . . Toyomura, 80 Hawaii 18-19, 904 P.2d 903-04 . . .) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). This court may also consider " he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it . . . to discover it
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