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Crichfield v. Grand Wailea Company7/31/2000
admission for the use of the land; or (3) the injury was suffered by a "house guest."
B. Judicial Interpretation of HRUS
Although HRUS has been in effect for over thirty years, this court has never directly addressed the statute. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), however, recently reviewed HRUS in Atahan v. Muramoto, 91 Hawaii 345, 984 P.2d 104 (App.), cert. dismissed, 91 Hawaii 345, 984 P.2d 104 (1999), but the questions of what constituted a "recreational purpose" or whether the statute afforded a general affirmative defense to commercial property owners were not considered as such.
On the other hand, a number of federal decisions have construed HRUS. See Howard v. United States, 181 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999); Palmer v. United States, 945 F.2d 1134 (9th Cir. 1991); Buddle v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. Iowa 1991); Stout v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 538 (D. Haw. 1987); Viess v. Sea Enterprises Corp., 634 F. Supp. 226 (D. Haw. 1986). Grand Wailea urges us to follow the holding and reasoning of Howard.
In Howard, the plaintiff, who was the wife of a military officer on active duty, was injured on a floating dock. At the time of the injury , she had just completed a privately conducted class in sailing at the Hickam Harbor Recreational Facility ("Hickham Harbor"), which was located at the Hickam Air Force Base and was maintained by the military. She was gathering a sail when an incoming swell caused the floating dock to move unexpectedly. As a result, the gangway rolled onto her foot. See Howard, 181 F.3d at 1065-66. She sued the United States, which asserted HRUS as an affirmative defense. Id. at 1066.
The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that: (1) HRUS did not apply because she was a business invitee; and (2) she was not engaged in a "recreational" activity at the time of the injury , but, rather, had taken the boating class for a "professional" purpose in order to learn how to become a sailing instructor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to read a "business invitee" exception into HRUS and held:
The language of the HRUS is unambiguous and clearly extends immunity to any landowner who allows "any person" to enter onto his or her land "without charge" for "recreational purposes." § 520-4. The only exceptions to this grant of immunity are also stated in unambiguous terms: (1) where injury is caused by the landowner's willful or malicious acts or omissions; (2) where the landowner "charges" the person to enter or go on the land; and (3) where the injured party is a "house guest." § 520-5. There is, therefore, no need to resort to the legislative history of the HRUS in search of an exception that is clearly not included. See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 1035, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997). Howard, 181 F.3d at 1072.
With regard to the plaintiff's argument that she was engaged in a professional -- rather than a recreational -- purpose, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff's professional motivation for enrolling in the sailing course was "not relevant." Howard, 181 F.3d at 1073. The Ninth Circuit reasoned:
Holding that it is the landowner's intent that controls whether the recreational use statute applies in this situation furthers the purpose of the HRUS of encouraging landowners to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes. See § 520-1. As the Government points out: "If land owners were required to screen each individual entering their property to ensure that each and every person had a proper recreational purpose so that the HRUS applied, then landowners would not open their property at all, defeating the pu
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