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Crichfield v. Grand Wailea Company7/31/2000
rpose of the statute."
In summary, although Howard may have had professional as well as personal reasons for taking the course, her alleged "professional" motivation does not convert her into a "nonrecreational" user. Her subjective intent is, in this situation, immaterial. Howard, 181 F.3d at 1073 (footnote omitted).
Were we to apply the Howard rule and hold that a plaintiff's subjective intent is immaterial to whether HRUS applies to immunize a landowner, then the Crichfields' allegedly "commercial" purpose underlying their presence at the hotel would not defeat the application of HRUS. In our view, however, Howard misconstrued HRUS on this point.
C. A person's subjective intent in being present on an "owner's" land is material to whether the person is a "recreational user" engaged in a "recreational purpose" at the time the person sustains a personal injury .
HRUS unambiguously provides in relevant part that "an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes." HRS § 520-3. By its plain language, HRUS does not apply if a person is entering or using the land for a non-recreational purpose -- i.e., for a commercial purpose, such as purchasing or consuming a meal. HRUS is ambiguous, however, regarding the standpoint or perspective from which a "recreational purpose" is ascertained. Without resort to extrinsic interpretive aids, we are therefore unwilling to hold, as the Ninth Circuit did in Howard, that the subjective intent prompting a person to enter or use another's land is immaterial to the question whether HRS § 520-3 relieves a landowner of any duty to the person to keep the premises safe for "entry or use."
We note, however, as a preliminary matter, that the subjective intent of an "owner" of "land" is obviously relevant to whether he or she has directly or indirectly invited or permitted an injured party to "use" the "land" without "charge" for a "recreational purpose." Inasmuch as Grand Wailea held its beach front grounds open to the public, it equally obviously, albeit impliedly, invited and permitted the Crichfields to use its "land" without charge. Indeed, it is self-evident that Grand Wailea opened its grounds to the public both for commercial purposes -- such as cultivating the good-will of visitors and thereby encouraging them to patronize the resort monetarily -- and for recreational purposes -- such as permitting public access to the beach and ocean or permitting the public freely to roam the grounds for exercise or pleasure. However, whether the Crichfields were exclusively "recreational" users furthering a "recreational purpose" within the meaning of HRUS, on the one hand, or, in addition, were "commercial" users on their way to patronize the Grand Wailea's cafe, on the other, constitutes a genuine issue of material fact.
In this connection, Grand Wailea urges that, inasmuch as the Crichfields' affidavits were unsigned at the time the circuit court conducted the hearing on Grand Wailea's motion for summary judgment, the circuit court should not have considered the factual allegations contained therein. Absent those factual allegations, Grand Wailea argues, the fact that the Crichfields entered and used Grand Wailea's land for a recreational purpose was uncontroverted and, therefore, the record failed to reflect a genuine issue of material fact. In light of HRCP Rule 56(f) (1997), we do not believe that the circuit court abused its discretion in considering the substantive allegations set forth in the Crichfields' affidavits. HRCP Rule 56(f) provides that,
hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot f
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