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Butler v. City Of Peru8/14/2000
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
We grant transfer in this case to clarify the phrase "user or consumer" in the Products Liability Act and to reiterate the correct standard for summary judgment under Trial Rule 56.
Factual and Procedural Background
James E. Butler was employed as a maintenance worker for Peru Community School Corporation. On September 23, 1993, Butler was electrocuted trying to restore power to an electrical outlet near the Peru High School baseball field. The power source to the outlet was an electrical box located within a fenced-in area containing one of the field's lighting towers. The fenced-in area contained equipment carrying several levels of electrical power ranging from 110 to 7200 volts. Butler and a co-worker had been unable to identify the cause of the outlet's power outage, but had determined that the box that served the outlet had no power. Butler used a pocket tester rated for 600 volts to check the power supply to the other equipment in the fenced-in area. He was killed when he came into contact with a 7200-volt line.
The school and environs are in the service area of Peru Municipal Utilities, which is operated by the City of Peru. Butler's wife and his estate filed suit against the City and Peru Municipal Utilities (collectively Peru) alleging ten counts of negligence based on "the close proximity of high power lines to low power lines and the lack of any proper warning regarding, or insulation of, the high power lines." The Butlers alleged, and Peru denied, that Peru owned, operated, or maintained the electrical transmission system at the baseball diamond. Peru filed a motion for summary judgment on November 18, 1996. On February 10, 1998, the trial court granted Peru's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Peru did not own, maintain, or control the allegedly defective equipment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. See Butler v. City of Peru, 714 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Standard of Review
On appeal the standard of review of a summary judgment motion is the same as that used in the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Shell Oil Co. v. Lovold Co., 705 N.E.2d 981, 983-84 (Ind. 1998). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. See Shell Oil, 705 N.E.2d at 983-84; Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Guzorek, 690 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ind. 1997). The review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial court. See T.R. 56(H); see also Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind. 1993). We must carefully review decisions on summary judgment motions to ensure that the parties were not improperly denied their day in court. Estate of Shebel ex rel. Shebel v. Yaskawa Elec. Am., Inc., 713 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ind. 1999).
I. Summary Judgment as to the Negligence Claim
A. Summary Judgment Standard
The Butlers first claim that the trial court and Court of Appeals misapplied Indiana Trial Rule 56 and Indiana summary judgment law. Trial Rule 56(C) provides that a summary judgment movant must show "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The movant must designate sufficient evidence to foreclose the non-movant=s reasonable inferences and eliminate any genuine factual issues. Once the movant has put forward evidence to establish this, the burden shifts to the non-movant to make a showing sufficient to esta
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