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Blackburn v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh8/23/2000 nges in the character or scope of the use do not require additional specific consent of the insured. . . .
The initial permission rule extends omnibus insurance coverage to those persons who operate a vehicle with the express or implied consent of the insured. Manzella v. Doe, 94-2854, pp. 6-7 (La. 12/8/95); 664 So.2d 398, 402 (citation omitted).
The record is replete with evidence that Rials was granted permission to use the Scafco vehicle. There was testimony that Rials used the Scafco truck every weekend from the first weekend in November up until the accident. When Rials left work on Friday, Clark would give the truck to him so that he could visit his wife in Lake Charles. Rials would then return the truck to Clark's home on Saturday evening.
There was also testimony that Clark knew Rials frequented bars in the DeQuincy area while driving the Scafco truck, that Rials drove to a barbeque at Clark's camp in the Scafco truck, and that Clark allowed Rials and two other employees to use the truck in order to drive to a concert in Austin, Texas, some eighty miles from their job site in Bryan, Texas. Further, testimony revealed that Clark knew Rials was never instructed as to the rules or regulations regarding the use of Scafco vehicles, that he had a drinking problem, that he was not allowed to use his parents' car because he had damaged it in an alcohol-related accident, and that he totaled his own truck in an alcohol-related accident. On at least one occasion, Clark sought and received permission from a Scafco manager for Rials to use a Scafco truck to move furniture. The record also revealed that at least two other Scafco supervisors used Scafco trucks as their personal vehicles because they did not own vehicles. Further, on the night of the accident, Clark knew that Rials had the truck in his possession, that he was at the party, and that he was drinking. For the afore discussed reasons, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining that Rials had permission to use the Scafco truck and that he was acting within the scope of that permission. Thus, we find that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Endorsement #005 allowed for the granting of permission to use a Scafco truck outside the course and scope of employment and that Rials was granted such permission. As such, we find that the National Union policy limits applicable under the general policy are $1,000,000.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting the Blackburns and Royers' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is reversed as it relates to the trial court's finding that the MCS-90 Endorsement of the National Union policy was applicable to Scafco, and affirmed as it relates to the trial court's determination that the general liability policy limits of $1,000,000 applied in that Rials had permission to use the Scafco truck and was acting within the scope of that permission. All costs are taxed against National Union Insurance Company of Pittsburgh.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND RENDERED.
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