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Nunez v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.8/23/2000
pporting the jury's finding was Garrett's testimony that he did not see either Deputy Pierotti or his patrol car as he neared the intersection, and that he saw a state trooper in the parking lot. Finally, the jury heard testimony from both Clayton and Lillian that the state trooper told Clayton that the accident was his fault since they were not directing traffic in the intersection at the time the accident occurred. Considering this evidence, we cannot say that the jury erred in finding that Troopers Gray and Bergeron breached their duty to use reasonable care in the directing of traffic through the intersection.
Of all the parties involved, Deputy Pierotti could most easily have prevented the accident from occurring by remaining in the intersection and continuing to direct traffic until either Trooper Gray or Bergeron physically took his place. Williamson testified that he did not hear the deputy speak to anyone before leaving the intersection. Since Deputy Pierotti could easily have prevented this accident by remaining on station a few minutes longer, we find that Deputy Pierotti breached his duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances.
D. Scope of Protection Element
In LeBlanc v. Stevenson, 99-885, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/22/99); 756 So.2d 356, 362, this court stated:
This prong of duty/risk has also been called legal causation. Legal causation "requires a proximate relation between the actions of a defendant and the harm which occurs and such relation must be substantial in character." Roberts [v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032,] 1056 [(La.1932)] quoting Sinitere v. Lavergne, 391 So.2d 821, 825 (La.1980). In Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So.2d 620, 622 (1972), the supreme court endorsed an ease of association test which asks how easily the risk of harm can be associated with the rule which was breached.
Under the facts of this case, there can be no doubt that Troopers Gray and Bergeron and Deputy Pierotti owed a duty to both the Nunezes and Garrett to protect them from colliding at this intersection. Thus, the risk of harm which faced the drivers as they entered the intersection can easily be associated with the officers' breach of their duty.
Garrett and Clayton
Employing the duty-risk analysis, we find that it was unreasonable for the jury to find both Garrett and Clayton free from fault in causing this accident.
A. Cause-in-Fact Element
We find that Garrett's and Clayton's actions in proceeding through the intersection were a cause-in-fact of the accident. Even though Garrett knew that a vehicle was approaching the intersection from his left, he proceeded through the intersection after stopping, because he assumed that vehicle would treat the intersection as a four-way stop and yield to him. But for his actions in proceeding into the intersection, this accident would not have occurred. Likewise, Clayton proceeded through the intersection without first determining that it was safe to do so. Even though he knew that the traffic light was out, he simply followed the line of traffic ahead of him and proceeded through the intersection without slowing down. His actions are not excused because the vehicle he was following failed to stop at the intersection and because he believed that the traffic lights were only employed during an event at the Burton Coliseum. Thus, we find that both Garrett's and Clayton's actions were a substantial factor in causing the accident.
B. and C. Duty Element and Breach of Duty Element.
In Soprano v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 246 La. 524, 534-35, 165 So.2d 308, 312 (1964), the supreme court disc
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