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In re Canavan8/17/2000
ng the admission of expert scientific testimony. Thus, before examining the judge's decision to admit Dr. LaCava's diagnosis and causation testimony, we review the basic principles for admission of scientific evidence. See Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 796 (1997).
Prior to our decision in Commonwealth v. Lanigan, supra, we required that in most circumstances "the community of scientists involved [must] generally accept the theory or process" for it to be admitted in evidence. Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218, 222 (1991), citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The general acceptance test, or Frye test, often proved to be useful because, if there is general acceptance of a theory or process in the relevant scientific community, the theory or process in question is likely reliable. Commonwealth v. Lanigan, supra at 24. However, we recognized that "strict adherence to the Frye test" could result in reliable evidence being kept from the finder of fact. Id. For example, a new theory or process might be "so logically reliable" that it should be admissible, even though its novelty prevents it from having attained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Id.
In order to account for this circumstance, we adopted in part the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and held that "a proponent of scientific opinion evidence may demonstrate the reliability or validity of the underlying scientific theory or process by some other means, that is, without establishing general acceptance." Commonwealth v. Lanigan, supra at 26. We noted, however, that in most cases general acceptance will be the significant and "often the only, issue." Id. Thus, we have concluded that a party seeking to introduce scientific evidence may lay an adequate foundation either by establishing general acceptance in the scientific community or by showing that the evidence is reliable or valid through an alternate means. Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 185-186 (1997).
In Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, supra at 797, we held that our review of a judge's Lanigan decision is de novo. We recognized that adopting a de novo standard of review was contrary to the position taken by certain Federal appellate courts, which generally adopted an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 797-798 n.14 We noted that the United States Supreme Court had not yet ruled on this question. Id. In General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-143 (1997), the Court held that Federal appellate courts reviewing a Daubert determination must apply an abuse of discretion standard. In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Joiner and our commitment in Lanigan to follow the general proposition set forth in Daubert, we again address the proper appellate standard of review for a judge's Lanigan determination.
The Court in Joiner held that a judge's determination on the reliability of scientific testimony is no different from other evidentiary decisions by a trial judge that are reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. We agree with this conclusion. The advantage of applying a de novo standard of review for the admission of scientific testimony is that an appellate court may conduct a thorough review of the relevant scientific literature on a particular subject and reach a well-informed decision that will serve as precedent to guide trial judges in future cases. The shortcoming in this approach, however, is that it assumes that "the application of the particular scientific method would not vary from case to case and thus would be worthy of a judicial stamp of approval or rejection as a matt
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