 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Sabri v. Sabri8/1/2000
onduct inconsistent with a settlement agreement will ordinarily be held to be an abandonment of that agreement. Id. at 374, 119 N.W.2d at 743. Generally, proceeding to trial following a settlement agreement would be an abandonment. See id. But where performance is the method of acceptance, a contract can be created only by the offeree's performance. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 50 cmt. b. (1981). Here, respondents' performance of the agreed-on terms was the method of acceptance, and, therefore, there was no valid settlement agreement until after respondents completed performance. Because respondents did not complete performance until June 1998, when the Jordanian decree was issued, proceeding to trial in November 1997 was not an abandonment of the agreement.
Neither the parties nor the district court discussed the elements of contract formation as they apply to this case. The district court made only the conclusory finding that "all of the parties did enter into a binding settlement agreement in 1997." Although we agree with the result reached by the district court, the date in this finding appears clearly erroneous. See Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987) (stating that the appellate courts "will not reverse a correct decision simply because it is based on incorrect reasons"). A decision is clearly erroneous if it is based on an erroneous view of the law. Anda Constr. Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Duluth, 349 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Sept. 5, 1984). Here, if a settlement agreement had been reached on November 22, 1997, it would have been abandoned when the parties proceeded to trial two days later. Because we conclude that respondents accepted appellant's offer by performance, and respondents did not complete performance until June 1998, the settlement agreement was created in June 1998. Therefore, there was no settlement agreement to be abandoned when the parties proceeded to trial in November 1997.
II. Evidentiary Rulings
Appellant argues that:áá(1) respondents' affidavits lack proper foundation; (2)árespondents' affidavits state legal conclusions; and (3) the document from Jordan lacks proper foundation. But appellant failed to raise any of these objections to the district court, and the admission of evidence cannot be challenged on appeal unless a timely objection was made. Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); see Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Therefore, appellant has waived a challenge to the admission of this evidence.
III. Findings of Fact
The district court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law when deciding a case on its merits. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. A dismissal pursuant to rule 41.02 operates as an adjudication on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(c). Thus, the district court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision. Appellant argues that the district court's findings of fact are insufficient.
First, appellant contends that finding a settlement agreement required a finding that there had been a definite offer and acceptance that demonstrated a meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the agreement. See Jallen, 264 Minn. at 374, 119 N.W.2d at 743. Appellant also argues that the district court was required to make a finding on appellant's credibility because it rejected his testimony that no settlement agreement was reached. But findings "are not required when the decision necessarily decides all the disputed facts." Minneapolis Community Dev. Agency v. Mark Lee Prods., Inc., 411 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Minn. App. 1987) (citing Crowley Co. v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 394 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Minn. App. 1
Page 1 2 3 4 Minnesota Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|