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Ly v. Nystrom8/3/2000
to state a claim under the Private AG Statute based on our conclusion that the legislature could not have intended to sweep every private dispute based on fraud, and falling within the CFA, into a statute where attorney fees and additional costs and expenses would be awarded, because to do so would substantially alter a fundamental principle of law deeply ingrained in our common law jurisprudence–that each party bears his own attorney fees in the absence of a statutory or contractual exception. See Church of Nativity, 491 N.W.2d at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Minn. 1983) ("We have long held that attorney fees are not recoverable in litigation unless there is a specific contract permitting or a statute authorizing such recovery."). We have for as long presumed that statutes are consistent with the common law, and if a statute abrogates the common law, the abrogation must be by express wording or necessary implication. See In re Shetsky, 239 Minn. 463, 469, 60 N.W.2d 40, 45 (1953). We decline to construe legislative intent to abrogate the common law with regard to the attorney fees provision in the absence of a clear purpose to do so.
Based on these considerations we hold that the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public. We believe that this conclusion is consistent with the history and purpose of the office of the attorney general to prosecute misrepresentations involving only matters of public interest. Appellant was defrauded in a single one-on-one transaction in which the fraudulent misrepresentation, while evincing reprehensible conduct, was made only to appellant. A successful prosecution of his fraud claim does not advance state interests and enforcement has no public benefit, and is not a claim that could be considered to be within the duties and responsibilities of the attorney general to investigate and enjoin.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
CONCURRENCE / DISSENT
PAGE, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent. I agree with that portion of the court's opinion holding that the Consumer Fraud Act applies to a cause of action brought by a plaintiff who was defrauded in an isolated one-on-one purchase of a restaurant for the purpose of selling restaurant services. I disagree, however, with that part of the opinion holding that Minn. Stat. §á8.31, subd. 3a (1998) does not permit an award of attorney fees in cases arising under the Consumer Fraud Act unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the cause of action has a public benefit. "[When] the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, we have no right to construe or interpret the statute's language." Tuma v. Commissioner of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn. 1986). "Our duty in such a case is to give effect to the statute's plain meaning." Id. The words the legislature used in Minn. Stat. §á8.31, subd. 3a are clear and free from ambiguity. Subdivision 3a, in relevant part, reads:
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney's fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court. Minn. Stat. §á8.31, subd. 3a (emphasis added).
Had the legislature intended to limit the scope of section 8.31, subdivision 3a to those causes of action that have a public benefit, it could have easily done so. Whether for good or fo
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