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Thirkield v. State8/1/2000
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Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) allows the admission, for impeachment purposes, of evidence of prior felony convictions for crimes not involving dishonesty or false statement if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial nature. A trial court must consider the following factors: (1) the impeachment value; (2) the date of the conviction and the defendant's subsequent history; (3) the similarity of the past crime to the present offense; (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 537-38 (Minn. 1978)); State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993).
The trial court's decision to admit appellant's prior convictions is only weakly supported by several of the Jones factors: none of the offenses directly implicates veracity, the two prior aggravated robbery convictions appear identical to the offense here, and the 1985 and 1986 convictions are over ten years old and stale. Nevertheless, upon closer examination of the dates of each offense and the time appellant spent either incarcerated or on supervised release, these four convictions demonstrate a continuous pattern of criminal conduct. See Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d at 586 (where pattern of lawlessness shown, prior offenses do not lose "any relevance by the passage of time"). Finally, any potential that the jury might use this evidence substantively because of the similarity of the crimes would have been lessened or alleviated by a limiting instruction. See State v. Bellcourt, 305 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. 1981) (admitting prior aggravated robbery conviction at aggravated robbery trial).
Importantly, the last two Jones factors weigh heavily in favor of admitting appellant's prior convictions. The jury heard appellant's theory of the case through his alibi witnesses, and his own testimony was not that crucial to his case. State v. Bettin, 295 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1980) (court may exclude prior conviction if admission might "cause the defendant not to testify and if it is more important for the jury to hear defendant's version of the case"). And because appellant failed to make an offer of proof on what his testimony would have been, we cannot determine whether his credibility would have been an issue. See Inhot, 575 N.W.2d at 587. Further, other convincing, circumstantial evidence supports appellant's conviction, including the fact that the officers saw only one set of footprints, followed them, and came upon appellant, who was jacketless, breathing heavily, and had fresh snow on his shoes. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling appellant's prior convictions admissible for impeachment purposes.
III.
Appellant has filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he claims, for the first time on appeal, that the eyewitness identifications were unconstitutional and highly suggestive as "cross racial identification ," "because he was the only African American in the courtroom." As the state argues, this claim does not implicate any constitutional violation; rather, appellant seeks to attack the credibility of the victim and police officers. The jury had an opportunity to evaluate the evidence and testimony, and obviously chose to reject the testimony of appellant's alibi witnesses and disbelieve appellant's version of the events. See State v. Miles, 585 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1998) (identification is question of fact for jury to determine).
Appellant also alleges "Perjury, Tampering with Evidence, Giving a False Police Report, Civil Rights Violations." He complains that J.N.'s purse was returned to her and was not photogr
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