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Finstad v. W.R. Grace and Co.8/22/2000
through the time-honored method of inquiring of experts about hypothetical scenarios.
61 It is true, as the Court posits, that the Legislature did not expressly include pending or potential litigation against a defendant in enacting § 27-1-221(7), MCA. It did, however, as noted above, mandate consideration of the defendant's "financial affairs, financial condition, and net worth . . . ." See § 27-1-221(7)(a), MCA. I submit that such broad categorization of matters bearing on a defendant's financial condition which must be considered by a jury in determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded easily encompasses the evidence at issue here. Nor--the Court's implication to the contrary notwithstanding--is there any requirement for an itemized listing of every conceivable kind of information which might fall within those categories, especially given the Legislature's inclusion of such broad categories of information in the first instance.
62 Furthermore, the language the Legislature used in § 27-1-221(7)(b)(ix), MCA, that matters to be considered include "any other circumstances that may operate to . . . reduce, without wholly defeating, punitive damages[,]" matches the breadth of the mandatory categories of information relating to a defendant's financial condition set forth in § 27-1-221(7)(a), MCA. Clearly, given the jury's award of $83,000 in punitive damages, the W.R. Grace evidence at issue did not wholly defeat punitive damages in the present case. Just as clearly, that evidence easily falls within the broad "any other circumstances" serving to reduce punitive damages language used by the Legislature.
63 The Court's somewhat facile observation that the Legislature did not include "other pending or potential litigation" within the ambit of matters to be considered is insupportable given the breadth of the language the Legislature quite purposely did use in both subsections (a) and (b) of § 27-1-221(7), MCA. Its further statement that the type of evidence at issue here "could not have been" what the Legislature intended is, itself, entirely speculative and equally insupportable in light of the legislative language.
64 For these reasons, it is clear that the District Court did not act arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceed the bounds of reason in admitting the challenged evidence. Consequently, there is no abuse of discretion here.
65 Finally, even assuming arguendo that an abuse of discretion had been established, error cannot be predicated on a ruling admitting evidence "unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]" Rule 103(a), M.R.Evid. Since punitive damages were awarded and, as a result, the evidence at issue did not wholly defeat such a recovery, I cannot see how the Finstads' substantial rights were affected. True, they sought--and hoped for--a larger punitive damage award. The Court apparently agrees a larger punitive damage award should have been made. Neither seeking nor hoping, however, constitutes a "substantial right" to a larger punitive damage award. Such matters are solely within the province of the jury.
66 I would affirm the District Court's admission of the W.R. Grace evidence at issue here. I dissent from the Court's failure to do so.
KARLA M. GRAY
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