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Vitale v. Jefferson Insurance Company of New York8/18/2000
Specifically, appellants argue that the policy provided coverage because it contained an extremely broad insuring clause from which the operation of motor vehicles by Dennis, Clara, and Second Mom was not excluded from coverage. We disagree.
In reviewing coverage under an insurance policy, we are guided by several well-recognized tenets of construction. First, we have held that we will construe the terms of an insurance policy in their plain and ordinary sense and from the viewpoint of one not trained in law. See National Union Fire Ins. v. Reno's Exec. Air, 100 Nev. 360, 364, 682 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1984). Second, we have held that when an insurer restricts coverage of a policy, it should employ language that clearly and distinctly communicates to the insured the nature of the limitation. See id. Finally, we have held that any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. See id.
The insuring clause in the policy at issue provides that:
"The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, . . . .
An occurrence is defined as:
n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured: . . . ."
Although this insuring clause contains broad language, it is clearly limited by the policy section titled "Exclusions." Particularly, damages associated with an automobile accident are excluded in provision (b) that provides:
"This insurance does not apply:
(b) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of
(1) any automobile or aircraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured, or
(2) any other automobile or aircraft operated by any person in the course of his employment by any insured;
. . . ."
In Senteney v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 101 Nev. 654, 656, 707 P.2d 1149, 1150 (1985), we held that an analogous automobile exclusion provision was valid in a homeowner's policy because it was clear and unambiguous. In so doing, we stated that this court would neither rewrite unambiguous insurance provisions nor attempt to increase the legal obligations of the parties where the parties intentionally limited such obligation. See id. at 656, 707 P.2d at 1151.
In light of this court's holding in Senteney and the plain language of the policy, we conclude that exclusion (b) clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for losses arising out of the automobile accident. As noted, appellants contend that exclusion (b) does not apply to them because Dennis is not a "person insured" under the policy.
The term "person insured" is defined, in relevant part, under section II of the policy:
"(a) if the named insured is designated in the declarations as an individual, [a person insured is] the person so designated but only with respect to the conduct of a business of which he is the sole proprietor, and the spouse of the named insured with respect to the conduct of such a business;
(b) if the named insured is designated in the declarations as a partnership or joint venture, [a person insured is] the partnership or joint venture so designated and any partner or member thereof but only with respect to his liability as such;
(c) if the n
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