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Collman v. State8/23/2000
ng the jury on an element of the offense, an error which is subject to harmless-error analysis." Johnson [v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469] (citations omitted) . . . ." Neder, 527 U.S. at 9-10.
Two of the cases cited above in Neder provide particularly strong support for our conclusion that the erroneous instruction in this case is subject to harmless error analysis: Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991), and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986). As in the instant case, both Yates and Rose involved murder trials where erroneous instructions were given concerning presumptions applicable to the element of malice.
In Rose, for example, the jury was instructed that proof establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that a killing occurred created a rebuttable presumption that the killing was done maliciously. Rose, 478 U.S. at 574. The Court ruled that "the error at issue here—an instruction that impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on malice—is not 'so basic to a fair trial' that it can never be harmless." Id. at 580 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). See also Clark v. Rose, 822 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987) (on remand from Supreme Court, the court of appeals applied harmless error analysis and concluded that the improper malice instruction was harmless).
Subsequently, in Yates, a murder case involving improper mandatory rebuttable presumption instructions on the element of malice, the Court set forth a two-step analysis for determining whether such instructions are harmless error. The Court explained first that " f . . . the fact presumed is necessary to support the verdict, a reviewing court must ask what evidence the jury considered as tending to prove or disprove that fact." Yates, 500 U.S. at 404. At issue is whether the jury looked only at the predicate facts or whether it considered "other evidence bearing on the fact subject to the presumption." The court should also apply the "customary presumption that jurors follow instructions and, specifically, that they consider relevant evidence on a point in issue when they are told that they may do so." Id.
Second, Yates explained, the court reviewing for harmless error must "weigh the probative force of that evidence as against the probative force of the presumption standing alone." Id. The issue is "whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the presumption." Id. If "the force of the evidence presumably considered is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the presumption[,]" then the reviewing court can conclude that the erroneous instruction did not contribute to the verdict rendered. Id. at 405.
Accordingly, based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Neder, Yates, and Rose, we hold that where, as here, a jury-instruction error is not "structural" in form and effect, this court will henceforth review for harmless error improper instructions omitting, misdescribing, or presuming an element of an offense. To the extent that Thompson v. State, 108 Nev. 749, 838 P.2d 452 (1992) is inconsistent with this holding, Thompson is hereby overruled. Under the holdings discussed above, the error at issue in this case is clearly subject to harmless error analysis. Having so concluded, we now turn to an analysis of whether instruction number 11 was in fact harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Harmless-error inquiry requires us to ask and answer: "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?" Neder, 527 U.S. at 18. If the reviewing court c
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Nevada Personal Injury Attorneys
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