 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Penley v. Honda Motor Co.8/25/2000
of repose contains no express exception for persons of unsound mind, operation of the TPLA statute of repose is nevertheless tolled by the legal disability statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 (1980 & Supp. 1999). Section 28-1-106 reads as follows:
28-1-106. Persons under disability on accrual of right. -
If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either within the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or his representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceed three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability.
According to the plaintiff's interpretation, the General Assembly did not need to expressly exempt persons of unsound mind from the TPLA statute of repose because the legal disability statute provides for the same effect. We disagree.
The language of the legal disability statute itself strongly suggests that it only applies to toll statutes of limitations. For example, the effect of section 28-1-106 is to extend a limitations period so that a plaintiff may "commence the action," and the language of section 28-1-106 addresses only those legal disabilities which were in place at "time the cause of action accrued." As we stated previously, statutes of repose differ primarily from statutes of limitations in that statutes of repose begin to run with some defining event without regard to the accrual of the cause of action. Indeed, it is certainly possible that a statute of repose will extinguish a cause of action even before the cause of action can formally accrue, and a statute of repose will operate to extinguish a claim that has accrued but has yet to be brought, thereby denying a plaintiff the opportunity to "commence the action." Accordingly, the references to the accrual and bringing of a cause of action indicate that this section is only applicable to extend the running of a statute of limitations, and we will not interpret the legal disability statute to give it effect beyond the fair import of its terms.
Further, because "statutes must be understood in light of the purposes the Legislature intended to accomplish by their passage," Business Brokerage Ctr. v. Dixon, 874 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1994), it is important to consider the general background against which the General Assembly enacted the TPLA in 1978. During the 1970s, state legislatures nationwide began to adopt statutes of repose in response to a "perceived `crisis'" in products liability law "following a decade or two of rapid expansion of liability." See W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts ยง 31, at 167-68 & n.26 (5th ed. 1984). In Tennessee, the General Assembly also perceived a "crisis" in products liability lawsuits, and it was clear that this perceived crisis was the primary motivation for the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978. In the preamble to the TPLA, the General Assembly stated that
WHEREAS, The General Assembly finds and declares that the number of product liability suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments, settlements and the expense of defending such suits have increased greatly in recent years, and because of these increases[,] the cost of product liability insurance was substantially increased. . . .
WHEREAS, In view of these recent trends and for the purpose of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are producing, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to make product liability insura
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|