 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Richardson v. Miller8/16/2000
eplaced or indemnified" for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-119. See Nance v. Westside Hosp., 750 S.W.2d at 743; Hughlett v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 940 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
In this case, Ms. Richardson's legal obligation to repay the approximately $52,000 of covered medical expenses is contractual. As part of her health coverage, she has contractually agreed to reimburse Principal Mutual for medical benefits paid on her behalf if she subsequently receives those amounts from third parties responsible for her injury . Contractual provisions like Principal Mutual's are enforceable to the extent that an insured has received full compensation and has been made whole for his or her losses. See York v. Sevier County Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W.3d at 621; Board of Trustees v. Graves, No. M1997-00069-COA-R3-CV, 1999 WL 1086454, at *2 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1999) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). As a matter of contract law, Principal Mutual may legitimately seek reimbursement from Ms. Richardson. Consequently, her losses have not been "replaced or indemnified" by her own health insurance, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-119 does not prevent her from pursuing recovery of those medical expenses against Dr. Miller and Tokos. For that reason, the trial court should not have dismissed Principal Mutual's intervening complaint.
VI.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment dismissing the Richardsons' claims against Dr. Miller and Tokos and remand the case for a new trial consistent with this opinion. We tax the costs of this appeal in equal proportions to James Miller, M.D. and to Tokos Medical Corporation for which execution, if necessary, may issue.
Ben H. Cantrell, P.J., M.S. dissenting.
I concur in Parts IIA, IIB, III, IV and V of the majority opinion. I disagree, however, with the conclusion reached in Part IE. Therefore, I dissent.
Part IE of the opinion contains the conclusion that the trial court erred in granting Dr. Miller's motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding terbutaline's off-label use, including its labeling and the parallel PDR reference. I think this evidence is irrelevant to the issues on which this case was tried, or that were set to be tried when the trial judge granted the motion. As I read them, these issues were (1) that Dr. Miller deviated from the standard of care in using the drug so late in Ms. Richardson's pregnancy, and (2) that Dr. Miller should have discontinued the use of the drug after Ms. Richardson experienced chest pains. The only relevance the label and PDR reference would have is whether the drug should have been used at all. All the experts agreed that the drug is commonly used to prevent or stop premature labor.
Dr. Miller joined issue on the plaintiff's two theories and also contested the theory that the drug in fact caused Ms. Richardson's heart attack. In my opinion these issues fairly went to the jury and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
Therefore, I would affirm the verdict.
BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|