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1519-1525 Lakeview Bouldevard Condominium Association v. Apartment Sales Corp.8/14/2000
ir agreement, and other minor repairs were made thereafter under a one-year warranty. Again, none of the Contractors performed that work.
On January 21, 1992, Robert Ferguson purchased unit 1515, the southernmost unit. Again, minor repairs were made as a condition of the purchase agreement, and again, none of the Contractors made those repairs.
A severe storm raged during the week before January 3, 1997. On the morning of January 3, the land beneath the units began to slide down the hill. Unit 1519 dropped a vertical distance of approximately four feet. There were concerns that the units would slide all the way to the bottom of the hill and into the piers supporting the freeway, and the police briefly closed I-5. The condominium units were substantially damaged, and are uninhabitable. All three units have since remained vacant.
On February 4, 1997, the Lakeview Boulevard Condominium Association and the owners of each unit (Lakeview) brought suit against ASC, the City of Seattle, and the Contractors. Claims against the Contractors included negligent survey, negligent foundation design, negligent supervision of foundation construction, and negligent construction, particularly of the drainage system.
The Contractors filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions on grounds that the construction statute of repose barred Lakeview's claims. The court also granted certification of final judgment under CR 54(b).
DISCUSSION
Construction Statute of Repose: Applicability
The first question we must decide is whether the construction statute of repose applies to bar Lakeview's claims. That statute, RCW 4.16.310, provides:
All claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 shall accrue, and the applicable statute of limitations shall begin to run only during the period within six years after substantial completion of construction, or during the period within six years after the termination of the services enumerated in RCW 4.16.300, whichever is later. The phrase 'substantial completion of construction' shall mean the state of completion reached when an improvement upon real property may be used or occupied for its intended use. Any cause of action which has not accrued within six years after such substantial completion of construction, or within six years after such termination of services, whichever is later, shall be barred; Provided, That this limitation shall not be asserted as a defense by any owner, tenant or other person in possession and control of the improvement at the time such cause of action accrues. The limitations prescribed in this section apply to all claims or causes of action as set forth in RCW 4.16.300 brought in the name or for the benefit of the state which are made or commenced after June 11, 1986.
Lakeview argues the phrase 'termination of services' means that a claim against any person who provided an enumerated service is not barred until six years after the termination of all enumerated services by all providers. Thus, Lakeview argues that since services were performed at the homeowners' request 'well into 1992,' the statute does not bar Lakeview's claims even though none of those services were provided by the named Contractors. But Lakeview's interpretation would render the alternative trigger for the running of the statute ('substantial completion') superfluous. If all services must have terminated before the six-year period begins to run, there could be no services left to perform that would move a project from a state of 'substantial completion' to full completion. For contractors performing those final services, therefore, the st
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