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1519-1525 Lakeview Bouldevard Condominium Association v. Apartment Sales Corp.8/14/2000
atute runs from the date the last service was provided; for the others, it runs from the date of substantial completion.
Regarding the date of substantial completion, Lakeview argues the Legislature intended the period of repose to begin when the improvement is sold, so that the occupant would benefit from the full six-year period before losing the right to file a claim against a contractor. Lakeview thus argues that substantial completion cannot occur before sale. Because the Lakeview homeowners all purchased their units less than six years before the landslide, Lakeview argues their claims are not barred.
In support of this argument, Lakeview relies on a discussion on the Senate floor prior to passage of the statute. Senator Uhlman, responding to a question from Senator Guess, indicated that the Senate Judiciary Committee intended termination of services or substantial completion, 'whichever is later,' to ensure that 'tenants had moved in and had a chance to find out any errors or omissions. . . .' The bill as passed included the 'whichever is later' language.
Nothing in the statute indicates, however, that its protections depend on sale of the improvement; obviously many improvements to land are made that are not sold. Instead, the statute defines 'substantial completion' as 'the state of completion reached when an improvement upon real property may be used or occupied for its intended use.' Courts look to legislative intent when a statute is ambiguous, not when its language is plain, and on this question the statute is not ambiguous. The Legislature's use of the phrase 'may be used' instead of 'is used' plainly means that actual use or occupancy is not required for construction to be substantially complete. While the Senator's statement suggests the Legislature contemplated actual use or occupancy as a component of substantial completion, that concept did not find its way into the statute, and we may not supply terms the Legislature chose to omit.
Lakeview next argues that because the improvement was a condominium, and under the Washington Condominium Act, an owner's association is to be organized no later than the date the first unit is conveyed, the improvement could not be used for its intended purpose until early 1991 when the association was formed. But Lakeview provides no citation to the 1200-plus page record as to when the association was formed. In any event, the purpose of an owner's association is to clarify the rights and responsibilities of the owners, matters unrelated to whether a new building is ready for occupancy. We need not decide whether the association requirement could ever be relevant to fixing the date of substantial completion. But certainly, it is not controlling here, and we decline to read the requirements of the Condominium Act into the statute of repose.
Lakeview also argues the trial court erred in holding that issuance of the certificate of occupancy by the City of Seattle established the date of substantial completion. The court actually mentioned two events: 'In this case, substantial completion, I believe, did occur when the condos were being marketed and a certificate of occupancy had been issued.' We agree that in this case, at the point both events had occurred in August 1990, the project was substantially completed. Only 'punch list' items remained, and the record does not indicate that work yet unfinished rendered the project not substantially complete, i.e., not fit for occupancy. The fact that additional work was done later by contract with the purchasers does not alter the fact that in August 1990 the project was substantially complete.
Finally, Lakeview makes two arguments specific to Geotech.
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