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Hildahl v. Bringolf7/28/2000
perly, 65 Wn.2d at 779 n.1 (emphasis added).
Yet, despite the judicial concerns expressed in Epperly in 1965, six years later the Legislature again amended RCW 51.12.070, broadening its premium responsibility to encompass all 'person{s} . . . who let{} a contract,' in addition to those who let extra-hazardous contracts. Laws of 1971, ch. 289, sec. 81. Moreover, in the 35 years since Epperly, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed these constitutional questions. Epperly's dicta is neither binding nor persuasive, especially under the facts here, where Bringolf had not paid the premium before Hildahl's accident.
Thus, we conclude that it is not unconstitutionally arbitrary to provide RCW 51.08.070 employers with immunity from civil suit, while denying immunity to RCW 51.12.070 'person{s} . . . who let{} a contract' for work and who are 'responsible primarily and directly for all {industrial insurance} premiums upon the work.' The latter group's surety-like premium responsibility imposes only a temporary burden, reimbursement for which can be collected from the direct employer under RCW 51.12.070.
IV. Other Theories of Liability
In ruling that Bringolf was immune from suit and in granting summary judgment on remand, the trial court did not rule on the duty-to-warn or WISHA theories that Hildahl presented in his amended complaint. Consequently, we have not considered these other theories. Thus, we reverse summary judgment based on Bringolf's claimed immunity and remand to the trial court to determine whether Hildahl's other claims against Bringolf are factually or legally viable.
Reversed and remanded.
Hunt, A.C.J.
We concur:
Seinfeld, J.
Houghton, J.
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