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GILES v. SPARKMAN RES. CARE H.12/15/1999
s not permitted to engage in an unallowable degree of speculation.
We are persuaded by the Jackson court's reasoning. Appellant presented expert testimony that it was highly probable that Ms. Anderson would suffer a seizure if she did not have her medication and that the effects of the seizure would leave her vulnerable to injury , and helpless. Ms. Anderson was only forty-nine years old when she disappeared, and other than her mental illnesses and seizure disorder, she suffered from no other physical ailments. On these facts, we hold that appellant presented sufficient proof of proximate cause to have the issue submitted to the jury.
Although appellant has asked us to consider in our review a portion of Dr. Gale's testimony that was proffered but ruled inadmissible by the trial court, we decline to do so. The trial court excluded the testimony, and thus it played no part in its decision. In addition, appellant has not argued that the trial court's ruling was error.
Appellant also argues that it should be entitled to recover under the "lost-chance" theory, citing Blackmon v. Langley, 293 Ark. 286, 737 S.W.2d 455 (1987). Appellant did not ask the court for a ruling on this issue, and we do not address issues that are raised for the first time on appeal. Sutter v. Payne, 337 Ark. 330, 989 S.W.2d 887 (1999).
We also note that appellee Hot Spring County Medical Center contends that it was entitled to a directed verdict because it was not negligent. The trial court's directed-verdict ruling spoke only to the issue of proximate causation; the ruling did not address the culpability, if any, of the individual defendants. In the absence of a ruling, we decline to address this issue. Moreover, the trial court directed the verdict at the conclusion of Dr. Gale's testimony after being informed that, although appellant had other witnesses to offer, none of them concerned the issue of proximate causation. Because appellant had not yet completed his case, deciding this issue would be premature.
Reversed and remanded.
PITTMAN and ROAF, JJ., agree.
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