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Cronin v. Sheldon12/17/1999
109 Ariz. at 29, 504 P.2d at 930). But we have not held that the prohibition is absolute. The constitution does not guarantee a particular amount of damages, see Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 407, 904 P.2d at 869, nor does the constitution protect punitive damages. See Downs v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 80 Ariz. 286, 292, 297 P.2d 339, 342 (1956).
We have permitted the legislature to regulate a tort action "even though such regulation may -- and in a few cases no doubt will -- adversely affect the computation of damages that the plaintiff recovers." Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 407, 904 P.2d at 869 (the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act abolishing common law joint liability did not violate the Arizona Constitution's anti-abrogation and non-limitation provisions even though the statute would operate to reduce the amount of recovery in many cases). We reasoned that to preclude such regulation would "exclude the legislature from any meaningful enactment because almost any statute dealing with tort actions will affect the amount or potential of recovery." Id. at 407-08, 904 P.2d at 869-70. The legislature may, therefore, alter certain recovery schemes as long as an adequate remedy for the injury remains. See Boswell, 152 Ariz. at 18-19, 730 P.2d at 195-96.
The question before us is whether petitioners' ACRA-based tort remedies are impermissibly limited by the EPA. We respond in the negative. The EPA restriction pertains to a statutory right not recognized at common law. The right is now vindicated by ACRA's provision for equitable, rather than tort, relief. While the non-limitation clauses prevent limitation of the amount of damages that may be recovered, the EPA restricts only a particular remedy or theory of relief.
Accordingly, in Smith, supra, a common law negligence action for medical malpractice, we held that a statute permitting the defendant to make periodic payments rather than the traditional lump sum payment of the verdict violated the non-limitation clause. We reasoned that the amount of the verdict had been established with certainty, and that while theories of recovery were not in question, we were concerned with insurer solvency, rigid payout schedules regardless of the rate at which expenses were incurred, and a potential windfall for the defendant should the victim die before full payout. See Smith, 181 Ariz. at 16-18, 887 P.2d at 546-48. Our decision weighed the effect of two different methods of payment on plaintiff's pre-determined recovery. Conversely, in the employment relationship, overlapping theories of recovery, including breach of contract as well as related tort and statutory claims, make the calculation of damages uncertain. And where, as here, overlapping theories do exist, a restriction on a particular remedy or theory of relief does not offend article 2, § 31.
This court has upheld legislative enactments which regulate a theory of recovery, and we have invalidated statutes which place a monetary cap on damages. See Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 407, 904 P.2d at 869. The distinction has thus been made between theory of recovery on one hand, and the amount of damages on the other. We construe the EPA's exclusive remedy provision as protecting one of several theories of recovery, i.e., ACRA-based equitable relief, rather than the placement of a legislative cap on damages.
Importantly, the EPA does not preclude recovery of compensatory damages under federal law within parameters authorized by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1995), as amended, (Title VII), nor does it preclude wrongfully terminated employees from pursuing collateral common law tort claims related to discharge from employment, includ
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